In PS, one can either have an individually-directed claim, "you cannot account for X", or a generally-directed claim, "atheism cannot account for X", and in neither case is there some sort of burden of proof on the PS to make a real argument. Instead, the PS stands back, folds his arms, and waits for the defender to either have insufficient metaphysical arguments or incoherent ones to critique. End of story.
Steve accused me of trickery in referring to conceptual realism:
i) Does nsfl subscribe to Cocchiarella’s solution? Of is this just one of those blocking maneuvers recommended by Witmer to silence the presuppositionalist if you can’t answer him?
To which I replied:
I find both his forms of conceptual realism (intensional/natural) completely consistent with physicalism as an ontology. As I was reading them (sections 6 and 7, respectively), I found he had put into words what I tried to describe long ago on this blog, when you brought up "pure" conceptualism, in which these abstractions don't exist apart from our minds at all. Therefore, your accusation is refuted by the evidence that I resorted to conceptualism in the past as an explanation of abstract explananda within physicalism.Steve completely misunderstood this:
“Refuted” by what evidence? Yours or Cocchiarella’s? At the time, I was responding to your formulation, not his—since his formulation wasn’t on the table back then.
I'm referring to the accusation that I'm "employing a trick" via Prof. Witmer's advice by "falling back" to conceptual realism. I'm not claiming his worldview is refuted by my position.
The following exchange is from the newest thread, Steve's words in italics, mine blockquoted:
My purpose was to defend my own presupposition that physicalism is not incompatible with logic. Would you concede that conceptual realism is the solution? Do you admit that there is nothing absurd or incoherent in holding to physicalism and to one of Cocchiarella's forumulations for the explanandum of logic?No, I wouldn’t concede any such thing.
Presuppositionalism claims that all alternative worldviews are inherently and intrinsically self-defeating. Can you show this for someone who subscribes to physicalism and to conceptual intensional realism?
1.He says that “as a socio-biological theory of the human capacity for language and though, conceptualism must presuppose some form of natural realism as the causal ground of that capacity.”
But this is circular reasoning. He first classifies conceptualism as a “socio-biological” theory, then says it must presuppose some form of natural realism. That may be a valid inference, given the classification, but he does nothing to justify his naturalistic classification in the first place.
So are you saying that humans can have language and thought without any natural grounding? Human thought and language do not supervene upon natural processes: chemistry, physics, matter...? Is he supposed to instead presuppose the existence of the immaterial spirit, and deny that thought or language (as we know them) supervene upon the physical? And if he did that, and said, "Conceptualism is a spiritual theory, which presupposes some form of supernaturalism..." is that not the same circular issue?
2.He then says “As universals that can be realized indifferent places at the same time and that might have no instances at all in the world, natural properties and relations are not in the world the way that concrete objects are, nor can they be considered to have an ‘objectual’ nature in any sense as well…the unsaturated mode of being of natural properties and relations…[is] somehow analogous to the mode of being of concepts. Thus, just as predicable concepts do not exist independently of the human capacity for language and concept-formation, so too natural properties and relations[s] do not exist independently of the causal structure of the world.
Several basic problems:
a) He admits the existence of unexemplified universals: “might have no instances at all in the world.”
How is that possible if the world is all there is?
Are you claiming that "unicorn-ness" and "Lochness monsterism" must be instantiated?
b) He then attempts to find a nook for them by claiming that the “unsaturated” mode of being of natural properties an relations is “somehow analogous” to the mode of being of concepts.
But this is an argument from analogy minus the argument? How does he unpack the “somehow”? He doesn’t. Just his sheer dictum.
c) Moreover, even if there were an analogy, it’s only as good as the analogue which supplies the point of reference. He claims that predicable concepts don’t exist independently of human concept-formation.
But that, again, is a raw assertion rather than a reasoned argument. Why should I accept the claim which undergirds the analogy?
So he fails on both counts. He (i) gives us an argument from analogy minus the argument. And he also (ii) fails to argue for the underlying analogue.
3. He then says:
“abstract objects…according to conceptual Platonism, ‘exist’ in a realm that transcends space, time and causality, and therefore that ‘preexist’ the evolution of consciousness…In conceptual intensional realism, on the other hand, the dependence is not merely epistemological but ontological as well.”But if abstract universals are causally dependent on the evolution of consciousness, then this will collapse back into the “ontology of conceptual idealism,” which is what he was trying to avoid—and for good reason.
They are ontologically dependent upon the substance of matter, which is the substance upon which consciousness supervenes.
Why do you think he is avoiding conceptual idealism? He is a Christian, a Catholic priest.
a) If abstract universals like the laws of logic are causally dependent on the evolution of consciousness, then they lose their necessity and universality. They become descriptive rather than prescriptive or proscriptive. They can no longer distinguish logical reasoning from illogical reasoning, for they take human consciousness as their point of reference and point of departure.
b) Likewise, if abstract universals such as mathematical truths are causally dependent on the evolution of consciousness, then the universe did not exemplify any mathematical properties or relations prior to the evolution of consciousness.
In that case, the universe is evolving in relation to human evolution. The existence and structure of physical universe is, to that degree, causally dependent on human evolution.
c) Likewise, if mathematical abstracta are causally dependent on the evolution of human consciousness, then there can be no such thing as an actual infinite in math. You are thereby committed to finitism in math. But that is prey to a number of familiar criticisms.
Continuing with my own thoughts:
One could argue against this necessity in a few different ways, since as Walker points out, these transcendentals are "objective, prescriptive and metaphysically ultimate". I am thinking that Scripture cannot meet this requirement, nor special revelation generally…When Xians argue that the Scriptures provide for us an OPMU for morality, how does this fare through Walker's filter?… I would argue that this consideration presents a substantial challenge to the claim that OPMU morality can be based upon divine revelation via Scripture. It seems that the criteria cannot be met in an attitude-independent fashion, given the errant supposed copies we have of an OPMU moral law.Morgan simply confuses the order of knowing with the order of being. Moral “transcendentals” can be objective, prescriptive and metaphysically ultimate” even though our mode of epistemic access is not ontological objective or metaphysically ultimate.
And if our mode of epistemic access is neither ontological[ly] objective nor metaphysically ultimate, then from what position can you argue for their truth in these two areas? It seems like I could say that there is some phenomenon, X, that is OPMU. However, if I cannot access it epistemically in any OPMU fashion, then where is the argument that you can establish X as OPMU? Is it not necessary to have a complete and thorough knowledge of X in order to argue X is OPMU?
How do you know X?
How do you know X is OPMU?
What’s a transcendental argument? How do you mount such an argument? Good questions.
Although TAG is an indirect argument inasmuch as you are arguing for the existence of God by arguing from certain undeniable phenomena, the argument(s) for the identity of these phenomena as well as their theistic dependence will take the form of direct argumentation.
James Anderson has also disassembled the Van Tilian version of TAG into several subarguments.
http://www.proginosko.com/docs/IfKnowledgeThenGod.pdf
And these could be developed in more detail.
Interlocuter has responded to some of Anderson's arguments, which are good ones.
Oddly enough, Paul Manata has admitted that the "development" of the TAG from the PS position is not only premature for such an ability (to use it as an indirect argument for God), but he has admitted that it is only an assertion.
He points out that:
i) If X, then God
ii) X
iii) Therefore God
Supporting premise (i) is the problem, of course. Prof. Witmer talked about this a bit on Unchained Radio with Gene Cook.
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