Sean Carroll on The God Delusion

Sean Carroll has weighed in on Dawkins' book and Eagleton's reaction to it. Sean also mentions some other reviews: 3 Quarks Daily, Pharyngula, Uncertain Principles, and the Valve (twice). For some weird reason, he doesn't mention my reaction to it...(joke) although he tends to agree with me on the substance. I'm going to quote a large portion of the first section of his rejoinder, and then the concluding remarks.

Sean starts out by paraphrasing Eagleton, then hits on what the crux of my complaint was against Dawkins -- that he is not able to address atheology to the degree that he ought, because he has tried to do too much with one book:

“You’re setting up a straw man by arguing against a naive and anthropomorphic view of `God’; if only you engaged with more sophisticated theology, you’d see that things are not so cut-and-dried.”

Before jumping in, I should mention that I have somewhat mixed feelings about Dawkins’s book myself. I haven’t read it very thoroughly, not because it’s not good, but for the same reason that I rarely read popular cosmology books from cover to cover: I’ve mostly seen this stuff before, and already agree with the conclusions. But Dawkins has a strategy that is very common among atheist polemicists, and with which I tend to disagree. That’s to simultaneously tackle three very different issues:

1. Does God exist? Are the claims of religion true, as statements about the fundamental nature of the universe?
2. Is religious belief helpful or harmful? Does it do more bad than good, or vice-versa?
3. Why are people religious? Is there some evolutionary-psychological or neurological basis for why religion is so prevalent?

All of these questions are interesting. But, from where I am sitting, the last two are incredibly complicated issues about which it is very difficult to say anything definitive, at least at this point in our intellectual history. Whereas the first one is relatively simple. By mixing them up, the controversial accounts of history and psychology tend to dilute the straightforward claim that there’s every reason to disbelieve in the existence of God. When Dawkins suggests that the Troubles in Northern Ireland should be understood primarily as a religious schism between Catholics and Protestants, he sacrifices some of the credibility he may have had if he had stuck to the more straightforward issue of whether or not religion is true...

Sean concludes:

To be fair, much of Dawkins’s book does indeed take aim at a rather unsophisticated form of belief, one that holds a much more literal (and wholly implausible, not to mention deeply distasteful) notion of what God means. That’s not a completely unwarranted focus, even if it does annoy the well-educated Terry Eagletons of the world; after all, that kind of naive theology is a guiding force among a very large and demonstrably influential fraction of the population. The reality of a religion is manifested in the actions of its adherents. But even an appeal to more nuanced thinking doesn’t save God from the dustbin of intellectual history. The universe is going to keep existing without any help, peacefully solving its equations of motion along the way; if we want to find meaning through compassion and love, we have to create it ourselves.

He summed it up very well. Much better than I did.

I complained earlier (much earlier, before any of these reviews of Dawkins had come out) that I felt Dawkins' and Harris' work didn't address the deeper and more complex apologia. I said I understood them to be akin to literary generals, marshalling troops into a culture war. That is a necessary component to my own (and a largely shared goal amongst many like me) hope for the future -- arguing away religious fundamentalism.

Am I deluded? Probably. Does that change my motive, or energy? No. I see danger lurking inside of irrational beliefs. I confront it as best I can, and counter it with arguments as rational as I can develop. Will the validity of my arguments correlate indirectly to religious fundamentalism? Probably not. Will that dissuade me from the importance and gravity of my cause? No.

I think a book needs to be published from a godless perspective parallel to Paul Copan's How Do You Know You're Not Wrong? (I own it, btw) A concise, but footnoted and indexed, outlined and progressive, hard-hitting summary of the arguments against religion in general, and for atheism in general. An updated, expanded, more technical version of George Smith's classic work. When I say "concise" I do not mean less than 200 pages. But I mean summarizing the arguments with the minimal support required. Dealing with and dispatching some of the major objections to each argument for atheism. References to infidels.org and all of the popular, articulate atheist bloggers out there.

I am aware that Dawkins and Harris have a wide audience in mind, and write it that way. I am also aware that they do not have the sort of textbook-style work that needs to be written. Perhaps I should feel inspired...perhaps...
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Technorati tags: God

Gary Wolf Responds to Comments on "The New Atheism"

PZ recently critiqued the Wired article written by Gary Wolf that I passed around through Richarddawkins.net. His concluding remarks sum up my feelings as well:

The article is a perfect example of the tepid atheism that closes its eyes to the world, that advocates the kind of bland semi-solipsism that reassures itself that everyone else thinks in the same happily reasonable way, so we don't need to exert ourselves to confront the opposition. It's an attitude that will be popular, unfortunately.

The author of the article, Gary Wolf, showed up in the comments section of PZ's thread, and no one noticed. Gary Wolf said:

I've been reading this thread with interest. I urge those here who think that the Pastor Matt is the hero and Richard Dawkins the villain to please take another look at the story. The style of magazine writing is different than the give and take online, and sometimes points get missed.

But the main attacks here, the criticism of "tepid atheism" are well-aimed. While this may be taken only as repeating the fault, I have tried to reply to these criticisms in a recent post on aether.com.

I went to Gary's site, and pulled a quote from this article:

Dawkins, Harris, and some of the posters on Wired News and Pharyngula find the "free pass" given to religion to be worse than embarrassing; to them it is actually evil.

I can't manage to go along with them. I'm fine with banning such theories from scientific debate. (After all, science is a field with fairly strict requirements for admittance. Science has strong boundaries. Science coexists with all kinds of other social institutions, and those denied admittance to scientific conferences because they cannot meet the standards have many other ways to live and prosper.) But all social life does not require or thrive on the intellectual strictness of science. I see our tolerance of religious beliefs as part of a larger trend toward secularism. We've learned, through hard experience, that a gentle respect for a broad range of superstitions is a safe policy.

I think we all see the effect of gentle respect -- the spreading cancer that is religious fundamentalism has grown and grown. It is time to say "fu&* tepid atheism" and "fu&* gentle respect"; those with brains will understand the danger, and willingly sacrifice their sensitive religious sensibilities to the greater cause of preserving the human race from religiously-driven extinction. Those who don't, won't. There is a greater concern here than feelings and causing offense.

Gary just doesn't focus enough on that.

I don't know that the charge against secularists that we are "tolerant of everything except religion" is even wrong; so long as it is qualified that secularists are intolerant of violence-laden and dangerous religion. I have never, in all my time reading atheist sites and etc., seen a rant against Buddhism or Taoism.

I have never seen the godless rally around an article by a Quaker and demean and belittle his pacifism.

I have seen, over and over, atheists, secular humanists, etc., rally around those extremist elements of the Christian and Muslim religion and expose the folly and danger of their thinking (or lack thereof). And I hope to see more and more of it. I hope.
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Technorati tags: God, Religion

COTG #52

The 52nd edition of the Carnival of the Godless is up at Skeptic Rant.

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Technorati tags: God

GQS #2

Carl Sagan, Pale Blue Dot:

How is it that hardly any major religion has looked at science and concluded, 'This is better than we thought! The Universe is much bigger than our prophets said, grander, more subtle, more elegant'? Instead they say, 'No, no, no! My god is a little god, and I want him to stay that way.' A religion, old or new, that stressed the magnificence of the Universe as revealed by modern science might be able to draw forth reserves of reverence and awe hardly tapped by the conventional faiths.

God Quote Sunday #2
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Technorati tags: God, Religion

Steve Hays Responds to Prof. Witmer re Presuppositionalism

Steve Hays has weighed in on Prof. Witmer's response to PS. In a recent post entitled Machiavellian Atheology, Steve spends a great deal of time complaining that Prof. Witmer chooses to take a tactical perspective, focusing on debate, rather than addressing more of the substantive philosophical issues (in Steve's opinion). Of course, Prof. Witmer admits the purpose of his talk is largely in how to "respond" to those who present the PS in debate formats.

One of the things that I think will prove problematic is the issue of how the burden of proof is established in these PS arguments. The PS's claim that only internal critiques are valid to evaluate the coherence of worldviews. They also claim that there is "no neutral common ground" -- that the employment of logic/morality/etc., presupposes the Christian God.

So if they claim these things, how is it that they can establish, as Steve comments below, and as CalvinDude repeats numerous times (most recently here), what levels of justification are required to presuppose something, whether or not some things may be viewed as primitive and little explained? This seems a serious issue. I await a serious reply.

Steve writes [I'll add in a few links]:

At the time I was busy with other things, so I’ll now take the occasion to revisit that issue.

I'm glad Steve did, and I hope we can continue to discuss general presuppositionalism, as well as the question of whether or not theism is a necessary precondition of logic.

I would note, in passing, that Witmer freely concedes that Manata handily won his debate with Barker:

I think most impartial people would agree. I did, long ago (back in August, if I recall).

Exposition aside, Witmer’s presentation is a combination of a few substantive objections along with a lot of tactical advice. These are somewhat interrelated, but, for clarity of analysis, I’ll make some effort to address them separately. Let’s address the substantive objections first:

This talk was limited to one hour, and much of what he said was contained in the transcript that was made available. However, some of the peripheral issues that were discussed, especially in the following Q&A session, were not incorporated into his talk. He has told me, though, that he plans to revisit the issue in a while when he gets sufficient feedback and time.

That’s a valid criticism of one particular formulation of presuppositionalism. But this is easily rectified by scaling back the claim to a more reasonable burden of proof. The onus is not on the presuppositionalist to rebut every conceivable alternative to the faith. That would be an inhuman burden of proof. And it would saddle him with a double standard, for no one, whether believer or unbeliever, can meet such a hypothetical challenge.

One of the first points to make is that there is a fundamental difference between an individual-directed negative argument (IDNA): "you cannot account for X", a generalized negative argument (GNA): "atheism cannot account for X", and a generalized positive argument (GPA): "God is required to account for X". I have seen all three go under the guise of presuppositionalism.

True, when it comes to arguing for one’s own position or against a competing position, both sides have their own burden of proof to discharge.

But this is where things get problematic. If you are only making an "internal critique", then the question of how we establish a "burden of proof" that translates across both my own and your own worldviews, and meets our presuppositional standards, is difficult to answer. If I assert some specific premise, such as, "All claims must be substantiated via the scientific method," then you can obviously use that sort of hasty, generalized premise against my other premises, since I have established a metric for the burden of proof. What if I do not think a simple metric can be used, and that different levels of proof are required as we correlate to those things inside of and outside of generalized human experience and induction?

This is a valid criticism as far as it goes. Presuppositionalists can be guilty of substituting slogans for arguments. Paraphrasing the original claim.

Or considering a negative argument the same thing as a positive one.

However, this doesn’t mean that no such answers exist. There are book-length treatments on modal metaphysics from a theistic perspective which go into excruciating detail.

And I see this as a problem for both IDNA and GNA formulations of presuppositionalism. Rarely do these two ever interact with parallel treatments of metaphysics, ontology or logic from either a God-neutral, or atheistic perspective.

Here he’s transitioning from substantive objections to tactical advance. And notice, in the course of this transition, how he’s forgotten where he himself positioned the burden of proof?

I think he's pointing out that we all hold presuppositions, and that anyone who thinks otherwise is deluded. He's asking why "accounts" have to be given for presuppositions themselves, since your presuppositions cannot be properly "accounted for" either -- definitionally, these are assumed truths which form the basis of our starting points to make arguments.

His advice takes the form of: “You think we’ve gotta problem? Well, you’ve gotta problem too!”

I don't think he's committing the tu quoque fallacy. He's pointing out that this is a flaw in the PS strategy -- to imply an infinite regress, tautological difficulties, primitive facts, or circularity will not result if we justify what we presuppose, ad naseum.

But this is an attempt to flip the burden of proof rather than discharge the burden of proof. To say that unbeliever doesn’t have to justify induction on secular grounds because the believer has unwarranted beliefs as well—even assuming that this is true—is not an intellectually responsible answer. It’s fair to point out that the believer has his own burden of proof to meet. But that doesn’t shift the burden of proof from the unbeliever to the believer.

Again, I think he's addressing the necessity of "unburdening" everyone at the level of presuppositions and primitive facts.

The onus is still on the unbeliever to justify induction on secular grounds. The onus doesn’t go away just because he can claim that the believer has failed to meet his own burden of proof.

No, but if the PS argument is that the unbeliever has failed to meet the unbeliever's own burden of proof, and the PS argument is all about "internal critique", then this gets tricky to claim, doesn't it? This is what he addresses later on.

For another thing, even if these beliefs were about the same thing, both sides would bear their respective burden of proof. The onus is on the believer to justify induction on Christian grounds while the onus is on the unbeliever to justify induction on secular grounds.

But in so doing, how many other assumptions do you, or we, package in? How much of a regress will we get into? Typically PSs claim they have two assumptions: i) God exists (where God = all good, powerful, knowing, not a liar, etc.); ii) Scripture is God's Word. They then feel consistent in falling back on (i) and (ii) in order to discharge their own burden of proof re induction. I typically hear induction "defended" by Scriptures like Gen 8:22 (KJV) --

While the earth remaineth, seedtime and harvest, and cold and heat, and summer and winter, and day and night shall not cease.

But this assumes many things, especially that all of these things will remain *as they are*, in addition to just "not ceasing". That is, God would not be a liar, per se, if days became 29 hours and nights 5 hours, or if summer was 9 months long, and winter 9 months long. What the reader assumes (unjustifiably) is that induction is strengthened by this primitive verse, when there is no way to find support here without serious other leaps in logic. Some of the other assumptions include the translation of the verse, the choice of the MSS, the hermeneutics, etc., etc.

So, my point is that as much as PS advocates may believe they can always fall back onto these basic internal assumptions, especially when they do metaphysical apologia, they cannot. Too many other considerations are packaged into (ii) to allow that.

Even if the believer was guilty of shirking his side of the argument, that would’t prove that the uvbeliever was right.

Correct, because of tu quoque.

The problem with all this is that it’s so transparently cynical and unprincipled.

Cynical, perhaps; unprincipled? Hardly.

The unbeliever is entitled to take some things for granted “if” he has good reason to take these things for granted. The unbeliever is entitled to treat certain facts as primitive facts if they are primitive facts, and he has good reason for believing so. The unbeliever is entitled to say, “they just are, and that’s that,” only “if,” as a matter of fact, that’s a truthful claim.

Well that's not "for granted" then, is it? Care to tell me what "good reason" you have to believe that other minds exist? How do you show that this is a truthful claim? Besides, the whole basis of the PS argument is that internal critiques are all we can do. How do you inject into my worldview the "burden of proof" and the prerequisites for presuppositions? See the problem, here? You claim there is "no neutral ground". But you also claim you can neutrally evaluate my justification for presuppositions? That's where we get into classical foundationalism, or coherentism, etc., which is where theism and atheism will quickly find some issues.

The unbeliever is only entitled to revert to atheistic Platonism as his last-ditch stand if that fallback maneuver is actually true or he has good reason for believing it’s true.

Or perhaps the atheist realizes his own ability to respond to a IDNA is predicated upon that which he is committed to, and how familiar he is with the metaphysics thereof. Saying that the universals are metaphysically possible or impossible within a physicalist framework is one thing; accepting it as a presupposition is another; demonstrating it is quite a whole different story.

I have attempted to show (here, here) that conceptual intensional/natural realism is not inconsistent with physicalism to "account for" the laws of logic, and universals in particular.

Platonism, conversely, is parallel to theism in some ways -- it removes verifiability principles from the ball game, and makes non-veridical statements a matter of rule rather than exceptions. Talk of transcendent, universal, abstractions, existing outside of the spatio-temporal framework of our universe, sounds just about like God, doesn't it?

And, of course, if that’s what he thought all along, then he wouldn’t “revert” to atheistic Platonism, now would he?

Many people who are pressed by PS debates into commitments ought not overcommit to things they don't understand, myself included. His point is that metaphysical defenses of our worldviews are not simple, and that if one commits to physicalism and is shown they don't properly conceive of how to incorporate morality, values or logic or etc., the *best* thing to do is not dismiss values, logic and morality, (obviously) but instead to change their commitment to a particular metaphysic. This isn't dishonest. He's pointing to the relative priority of core presuppositions versus ontological commitment.

The unbeliever is entitled to be noncommittal if he is, indeed, truly noncommittal, and has good reason to be a minimalist.

But how does an externalist critique verify "good reason"? Same problem, over and over and over...

But that Witmer is saying throughout this section is that an unbeliever should make opportunistic use of any blocking maneuver or evasive maneuver whether he believes it or not. He is coaching the unbeliever on how to win the debate without winning the argument. How to lose on the merits, but survive intact. It’s pretty revealing that Witmer would resort to such unscrupulous counsel.

How to keep ones wits about the debate -- that jettison of one's faculties, morality, etc., is not the end result of "losing". At best, someone can defend themselves adequately from an IDNA, and deflect the criticism of internal incoherence by demonstration. At worst, someone can be shown by IDNA that some of their presuppositions conflict with their explanations -- what should "give"? The fundamentals? No. The explanations.

Use any old argument, good or bad, just to get the presuppositionalist off your back! The convenience, and not the cogence, of the argument is all that matters.

It can sound that way, but remember that he is indeed referring to a debate strategy, and he calls it such. On the other hand, he points out the flaws in the arguments of PS (which you addressed in the beginning), and gives advice on responding along substantive lines throughout the talk.

On another subject, nsfl also refers us to an article by Nino Cocchiarella on “Logic & Ontology.”

I have been looking around for a few months for an online, free resource that I could reference to try to describe how logic/morality/etc. can be incorporated into physicalism. This was the best I've yet found. Prof. Witmer recommended some books I put on reserve at the library, but they're not due back until 12/4.

i) Does nsfl subscribe to Cocchiarella’s solution? Of is this just one of those blocking maneuvers recommended by Witmer to silence the presuppositionalist if you can’t answer him?

I find both his forms of conceptual realism (intensional/natural) completely consistent with physicalism as an ontology. As I was reading them (sections 6 and 7, respectively), I found he had put into words what I tried to describe long ago on this blog, when you brought up "pure" conceptualism, in which these abstractions don't exist apart from our minds at all. Therefore, your accusation is refuted by the evidence that I resorted to conceptualism in the past as an explanation of abstract explananda within physicalism.

ii) Cocchiarella discusses the three standard theories of universals, and opts for a synthetic solution: conceptual realism.

With two subtle distinctions: conceptual intensional realism, and conceptual natural realism. I am working on a blog post to put up at DC and my own site on this topic.

I myself also opt for a synthetic solution: theistic conceptual realism. Cocchiarella confronts me with a false dilemma, for I favor an option which isn’t even on the list. Therefore, Cocchiarella hasn’t boxed me into accepting his solution. And, for reasons I won’t go into at the moment, I don’t accept his solution.

Steve, the point of my quoting this reference was not to box you into a dilemma, but to extricate myself from the accusation of being in one. My purpose was to defend my own presupposition that physicalism is not incompatible with logic. Would you concede that conceptual realism is the solution? Do you admit that there is nothing absurd or incoherent in holding to physicalism and to one of Cocchiarella's forumulations for the explanandum of logic?

Presuppositionalism claims that all alternative worldviews are inherently and intrinsically self-defeating. Can you show this for someone who subscribes to physicalism and to conceptual intensional realism?

Response to Robert O'Brien re Theodicy

The problem of evil (PoE) has been floating around a lot lately at DC. Matthew's post in which he tells of coming to see the airtight and powerful nature of the PoE as an atheological proof. Robert O'Brien dropped in and spoke out contrariwise:

You can count me among those who do not find the argument from evil compelling.

I responded by asking him why, by way of theodicy. He said his theodicy was a combination of the views of Boethius and Liebnitz. My reply (open the comments box and scroll down):

Robert,

Now that's interesting, as those two seem very different. I'd love to hear more.

Are you an orthodox Christian? I mean, considering that neither of these theodicies are Christian in the "orthodox" sense.

Boethius was anti-Augustinian, anti-Pauline in his conception of judgment and punishment of the wicked:

"...anything which turns away from goodness ceases to exist..." (Book IV, 125)

believed that wrong is done in error:

"...the mind seeks its own good, though like a drunkard it cannot find the path home" (Book III, 80)

One of the most serious flaws I found in Boethius was when he asked Lady Philosophy (Book V, 149):

"But is there room in this chain of close-knit causes for any freedom of the will? Or does the chain of Fate bind even the impulses of the human mind?"

and she answered,

"There is freedom," she said. "For it would be impossible for any rational nature to exist without it."

Yes and no. Freedom of will and freedom of action and freedom of knowledge are all separate, and must be thought of as such.

i) The will cannot choose to act upon that which it does not know
ii) The knowledge of a creature is determined by God - experiences, senses, and revelation
iii) The limits of action are twofold -- a) what the will can choose among its options; b) and what the person can physically accomplish
iv) Apropos (b), God sets the limits of human physical freedom by their bodily functions, their environment, their resources, etc.
v) Therefore, from the top to bottom, we see the crucial consideration of how God limits "freedom", from the very knowledge that the will sifts through to choose, to the will itself choosing among options which are available to it, to the creature being able to act upon that which it has chosen

Lady Philosophy talks on to Boethius:

"Whatever by nature has the use of reason has the power of judgment to decide each matter ... "

Again, the question of what humans know, and who controls that knowledge, is operative

"Human souls are of necessity more free when they continue in the contemplation of the mind of God and less free when they descend to bodies, and less still when they are imprisoned in earthly flesh and blood."

Then one must wonder why it is that humans were imprisoned thusly.

"They reach an extremity of enslavement when they give themselves up to wickedness and lose possession of their proper reason ..."

This sounds like a claim describing how our natures are made: we get "enslaved" to wickedness, and thus "lose" reason. But does it have to be such? Could the nature of man not be made (by the God, or whatever) such that "dabbling" in wickedness is possible, and retaining ones wits in the process thereof? His claim that doing wickedness = done in error = malfunction of the mind seems to clearly indict the maker of the mind with fault. This claim reinforces the ultimate responsibility of the maker of the nature of man. Did man's nature have to be made such that his mind can be "like a drunkard" and "enslaved" and "lose reason"? Does this theodicy solve the problem of evil at all, or merely describe it?

Of course, Boethius is more Plato and Aristotle than Paul and Augustine. I find that interesting, given that I thought you were an orthodox Christian of some sort or another.

On the other hand, Liebnitz seems an odd one to hybridize Boethius with. Unless you claim that the nature of man is the "least evil, greatest good" that it could possibly be -- that God could not have altered man's mind, man's knowledge, man's choices, man's freedom of action, to reduce evil further and increase good further? Perhaps this is how they hybridize?

Liebnitz argued that this was "the best of all possible worlds", and that this world had the greatest good and least evil possible -- his "sufficient reason" arguments.

In response, I would point to those sorts of evils that have absolutely no plausible explanation insofar as a "sufficient reason" -- clear accidents that did not involve human will, natural disasters (like the earthquake of Lisbon that all but killed the will of those defending Liebnitz' argument), etc. It is implausible to argue that God found it necessary to allow that evil in "the best of all possible worlds".

The natural disasters of the earth were necessary? God could not have made a world in which there was no need for earthquakes, tidal waves, volcanoes, etc.?

As Pangloss satirized in Candide, "the bay of Lisbon had been formed expressly for [Jacques] to drown in": is the sufficient reason of these natural evils that God made them so that humans and other animals would suffer their consequences?

Or are we to believe that the evil of those things is the least that it could be? That there really could be no fewer earthquakes and volcanoes, no fewer famines and droughts? Again, if God is in control of Nature, this argument reeks of absurdity from an evidentialist standpoint. From a logical standpoint, perhaps you could mount some sufficient reason, however unlikely or unbelievable (such as limits on the nature of man, or on God's creative freedom).

To claim that there is "sufficient reason" that a 1-year-old child died after a fall from a head injury, when trying to learn to walk, would be an interesting claim. It involves no natural processes, other than gravity, it involves no true sense of human free will, etc., etc. It becomes even more incredulous if you tack on something about the fate of the person's life, considering the necessity of their birth in the first place, if they were destined to die thusly, and also consider the people who have been allowed to live and inflict great harm on humanity (Hitler, Pol Pot, Stalin, etc.).

Perhaps you can enlighten me with more details? A post on your blog?

Hopefully he'll reply. I don't see much in these two men's theodicies that seems terribly compatible.
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Technorati tags: God, Religion, Philosophy

Local Interest: Library Volunteers Must Piss in Cup

Vurrry Insurresting. If you've never visited Levy County, you aren't missing much. But, now the county has become an object of derision for its stupid new policy.

Levy Country Libraries now requires piss tests of its volunteers to have the, uh, "privilege" of donating their time to reshelve books and collect microfiche. The average-aged volunteer is Social Security eligible. There used to be 55 volunteers, now there are 2. Part of the reason is the cost and travel required to take the test -- they had to drive here to Gainesville. Part of the other reason just must be the ridiculous quantities of illegal substances these old coots were ingesting. Gotta make sure grandma isn't cracked out, or else she might screw up the shelving categories, right?

WTF?!?!?

Bill Maher writes about this on the HuffPo.

New Rule: We Don't Need Drug Tests for Librarians

They can't have very nice lives - librarians. It's like being a teacher, only without the opportunities for dating, because the only kids you meet are the nerds. So the last thing America's shsssshing minority needs is the indignity of a urine test. But that's just what we're doing. I'm not sure this is the best use of our time.

The last time a librarian did something really stupid and reckless on drugs was when Laura married George.

Last year, Florida's Levy County introduced drug testing for library volunteers. Whose average age is between 60 and 85. The volunteers were required to drive to another city - Gainesville - and urinate in a cup "within hearing distance" of a laboratory monitor. That'll teach 'em for offering to work for free. "Okay, grandma, now get pissing. And I'd better hear a nice even unbroken stream."

And then something weird happened. Inexplicably, the number of volunteers dropped from 55 to two. It's almost like they didn't enjoy being degraded. And they call themselves the greatest generation.

I know what you're thinking. If Aunt Iris has nothing to hide, she can get a little of her own urine on her hands and prove she's not strung out on junk. Then we can feel safe, and she can go back to mis-shelving the Readers Digests. But then a second thought occurs to you, later, when you really, really think about it. And that thought is this: What the fu*& is wrong with us? Are we high?

They're not flying planes. They're showing the homeless how to use the microfiche readers. For free. The only people who profit from this are the stockholders of the drug testing company, who stood to make $33 a head, money the library would have otherwise just wasted on books.

A spokesman for the libraries said she wouldn't make the volunteers drive to Gainesville for their cavity searches anymore. And she also thought the problem wasn't the drug test itself, but the method they used. That's why they're looking into switching from urine tests to mouth swabs. The same method used by the Florida Department of Corrections.

Bill Maher is the host of HBO's "Real Time with Bill Maher" which airs every Friday at 11PM.

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Technorati tags: Humor

Political Google Bomb

I'm Googlebombing the important races.

See here for why, and here for his House list. See here for JG's Senate list. Jump on the bandwagon, if you want the Dems to win. They're the lesser of two evils, in my book.

Senate:

• WA-Sen: Mike McGavick


• VA-Sen: George Allen


• TN-Sen: Bob Corker


• RI-Sen: Lincoln Chafee


• MT-Sen: Conrad Burns


• MO-Sen: Jim Talent


• MD-Sen: Michael Steele


• AZ-Sen: Jon Kyl

House:

• AZ-Sen: Jon Kyl


• AZ-01: Rick Renzi


• AZ-05: J.D. Hayworth


• CA-04: John Doolittle


• CA-11: Richard Pombo


• CA-50: Brian Bilbray


• CO-04: Marilyn Musgrave


• CO-05: Doug Lamborn


• CO-07: Rick O'Donnell


• CT-04: Christopher Shays


• FL-13: Vernon Buchanan


• FL-16: Joe Negron


• FL-22: Clay Shaw


• ID-01: Bill Sali


• IL-06: Peter Roskam


• IL-10: Mark Kirk


• IL-14: Dennis Hastert


• IN-02: Chris Chocola


• IN-08: John Hostettler


• IA-01: Mike Whalen


• KS-02: Jim Ryun


• KY-03: Anne Northup


• KY-04: Geoff Davis


• MD-Sen: Michael Steele


• MN-01: Gil Gutknecht


• MN-06: Michele Bachmann


• MO-Sen: Jim Talent


• MT-Sen: Conrad Burns


• NV-03: Jon Porter


• NH-02: Charlie Bass


• NJ-07: Mike Ferguson


• NM-01: Heather Wilson


• NY-03: Peter King


• NY-20: John Sweeney


• NY-26: Tom Reynolds


• NY-29: Randy Kuhl


• NC-08: Robin Hayes


• NC-11: Charles Taylor


• OH-01: Steve Chabot


• OH-02: Jean Schmidt


• OH-15: Deborah Pryce


• OH-18: Joy Padgett


• PA-04: Melissa Hart


• PA-07: Curt Weldon


• PA-08: Mike Fitzpatrick


• PA-10: Don Sherwood


• RI-Sen: Lincoln Chafee


• TN-Sen: Bob Corker


• VA-Sen: George Allen


• VA-10: Frank Wolf


• WA-Sen: Mike McGavick


• WA-08: Dave Reichert

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Technorati tags: Politics

Dawkins Needs to Shut Up Sometimes

Recently criticizing the shallow critiques allotted to religion in the works of Harris and Dawkins, I felt a bit of catharsis. I aired my major grievance against Dawkins. I have always respected his philosophy towards science, and the care with which he probes evolution. I own many of the man's books. But now, he has said something just plain stupid and awful to Emily Hourican in The Dubliner:

The Catholic Church also has an extraordinarily retrogressive stance on everything to do with reproduction. Any sort of new technology which makes life easier for women without causing any suffering is likely to be opposed by the Catholic Church. Regarding the accusations of sexual abuse of children by Catholic priests, deplorable and disgusting as those abuses are, they are not so harmful to the children as the grievous mental harm in bringing up the child Catholic in the first place. I had a letter from a woman in America in her forties, who said that when she was a child of about seven, brought up a Catholic, two things happened to her: one was that she was sexually abused by her parish priest. The second thing was that a great friend of hers at school died, and she had nightmares because she thought her friend was going to hell because she wasn't Catholic. For her there was no question that the greatest child abuse of those two was the abuse of being taught about hell. Being fondled by the priest was negligible in comparison. And I think that's a fairly common experience. I can't speak about the really grave sexual abuse that obviously happens sometimes, which actually causes violent physical pain to the altar boy or whoever it is, but I suspect that most of the sexual abuse priests are accused of is comparatively mild - a little bit of fondling perhaps, and a young child might scarcely notice that. The damage, if there is damage, is going to be mental damage anyway, not physical damage. Being taught about hell - being taught that if you sin you will go to everlasting damnation, and really believing that - is going to be a harder piece of child abuse than the comparatively mild sexual abuse. [emphasis mine]

Wrong, Richard. So wrong. So stupid. Just keep your mouth shut sometimes, when you feel it meandering towards an area so outside your experience and expertise.

You're no longer making an intelligent critique of religion. You're ranting. You're preaching. You're baldly asserting things without any scientific backing whatsoever. You're acting like something I detest -- someone who rails against an ideology (usually atheism), without evidential support, by drawing huge non sequiturs. [HT: Hallq]
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Technorati tags: God, Religion

How Many ID-iots Does it Take to...?

An old net-acquaintance of mine, Robert O'Brien, once attended UF. He got an MS in Mathematics, so far as I can tell, is now teaching math at Cal State U - Chico, and he also received the distinction of having a popular blogger's "idiot of the month award" named after him. Robert alerted me, via his blog, that a math professor here at UF had signed Intelligent Design's ID-iotic pledge of allegiance sheet (my serious analysis here) to "dissent from Darwinism"; and so I decided to do a cursory search of the newest version of the document, revised June '06, to find out how many persons here at UF, and at VT (my "nourishing mother"), were logged on to their program. Sadly...a few:

In no particular order --

UF
1. Dr. George R. Lebo, Retired Assoc. Prof. of Astronomy -- this guy went to Wheaton for undergrad, so no great surprise there.
2. Prof. James E. Keesling, Mathematics -- he's the past president of the Christian Faculty Fellowship, and guess who else shows up at that page? Dr. Lebo.

VT
1. Dr. Malcolm A. Cutchins, Retired [Emeritus] Prof. of Engineering Mechanics (at Auburn) -- he got his Ph.D. at VT and invoked VT on the ID-iot list, so, I had to lump him in here...
2. Dr. David M. Howell, unknown employment status -- he got his Ph.D. at VT, published a paper with Dr. White (I knew him), but I can't find out anything else about the guy.
3. Prof. Jonathan D. Eisenback, Plant Pathology and Weed Science -- interestingly, the guy went to Bryan college, the site of the famous Dayton Scopes Trial.
4. Prof. Richard J. Neves, Fisheries and Wildlife Science -- mussels expert, went to UMass.

So that's what a cursory search for the terms "Florida" and "Virginia" yield within the newest version of the ID-iotic pledge. I'm actually going to write all of these guys and ask them what they think of my analysis of the statement that they signed -- that it is crafted so as to be deceptive. Perhaps one or two of them will agree and tell me they're going to write and ask to be taken off of it. As a side note, I did find one dead guy on the list -- David C. Chapman. I wrote and asked the DI about this, and Logan Gage kindly informed me that he was not added poshumously, so at least they aren't that low and dirty.

I will update if the "dissenters" write me back...hopefully they will see the light of day on this thing.
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Technorati tags: Intelligent Design, Evolution, Creationism

Secular Scorecards

A lot of things inform our decisions as voters. As atheists, agnostics, skeptics and freethinkers, one of those particularly relevant issues is how we are treated (or mistreated) solely on the basis of our (lack of) beliefs. Therefore, I thought it germane, considering the upcoming election, to give the "skinny" on how Florida's Congressional officials have done with their "secular scorecard".

The Secular Coalition for America has set up two things of note (yes, I'm late on this):

1) A $1,000 challenge to find the "highest-ranking elected official" who is nontheistic -- if you find the highest-ranking official, you win the $1,000
2) A "secular scorecard" for each member of Congress. They took 10 key votes concerning the Separation of Church and State, and religious freedom, and used them as a "measuring stick" to judge the Congressional official by. For more on the methodology, see HERE. See the results below the fold for Florida in detail (the table may be hard to view, so here is the House in .pdf; Senate in .pdf):

FLORIDA HOUSE	Party	RC24	RC46	RC48	RC204	RC283	RC492	RC378	RC385	RC386	RC388	Score
Bilirakis, M, 9th	R	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0
Boyd, A, 2nd	D	-	+	+	+	+	+	-	-	-	+	60
Brown, C, 3rd	D	-	+	+	+	nv	+	+	+	-	+	70
Brown-Waite, V, 5th	R	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	+	20
Crenshaw, A, 4th	R	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0
Davis, J, 11th	D	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	80
Diaz-Balart, L, 21st	R	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	10
Diaz-Balart, M, 25th	R	-	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	10
Feeney, T, 24th	R	nv	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0
Foley, M, 16th	R	-	-	-	+	-	-	+	-	-	+	30
Harris, K, 13th	R	-	nv	nv	-	nv	-	-	-	-	-	0
Hastings, A, 23rd	D	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	80
Keller, R, 8th	R	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0
Mack, C, 14th	R	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	+	20
Meek, K, 17th	D	-	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	-	+	80
Mica, J, 7th	R	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0
Miller, J, 1st	R	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0
Putnam, A, 12th	R	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0
Ros-Lehtinen, I, 18th	R	nv	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	10
Shaw Jr, E, 22nd	R	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	+	20
Stearns, C, 6th	R	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0
Wasserman Schultz, D, 20th	D	-	+	+	+	nv	+	+	+	+	+	80
Weldon, D, 15th	R	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0
Wexler, R, 19th	D	-	+	+	+	nv	+	+	+	+	+	80
Young, C, 10th	R	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	10
FLORIDA SENATE	Party	RC24	RC46	RC48	RC204	RC283	RC492	RC378	RC385	RC386	RC388	Score
Martinez, M	R	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0
Nelson, B	D	-	+	-	+	-	+	-	+	+	+	60

Note that the House winners here are split almost evenly down party lines: (D) Allen Boyd, Corrine Brown, Jim Davis (running for governor), Alcee Hastings, Kendrick Meek, and Debbie Shultz and Rob Wexler. Boyd was lowest with 60, followed by Brown with 70. All the other Dems got 80.

Contrariwise, the highest-scoring House Republican, with a score of 30, was...Mark Foley...

In the Senate, clearly Bill Nelson stomps Mel Martinez, 60 to 0.

Everyone has different priorities, but I thought it useful to present this information, just to factor it in to your personal equation, to help inform your decision. Also remember PERA, and join this Facebook group if you oppose it, as 160 others do, so far.

Why Do Atheists Care About Religion?

Atheists are often asked one (or both) of the following:

1) Why do you care about religion so much, if you don't believe? [this usually in response to the effort of the non-believer to point out flaws in religion]
2) Isn't atheism itself a religion?

As an example of question (1), see here.
As an answer to (1), see here, and here.

As an example of (2), see here and here.
As an answer to (2), see here and here.

One of the larger questions concerning (2) is the issue of legal protections conferred by the 1st Amendment. If atheists can be "protected" by the 1A, then people immediately consider atheism itself a religion -- but it is not. Instead, it is a position concerning religious beliefs. And it is for that reason alone that the 1A provides protection for atheists generally: because of the requisite protection of freedom of speech and expression, even and especially where they concern religious beliefs.

D1: 1b (1) : the service and worship of God or the supernatural (2) : commitment or devotion to religious faith or observance (Merriam-Webster)

The definition issue is "how do we define a religion?" If that definition includes any concept of the divine, or supernaturalism, then we immediately dismiss (2) as a viable question. Traditionally, the element of the supernatural is what separates religion from "all other beliefs". And this is why atheism is not a religion. Unless, that is, you consider it logical to say that not collecting stamps is a hobby... (Randi)

But, when people hold to claim (2), they typically define it as the first example did above:

D2: A person's religion is the sum total of his beliefs about God and the supernatural.

Of course, in this sense (D2), atheism is a religion, but is religion just a total of beliefs, or does it not specifically require a belief in particular things, and/or practices that reinforce said belief (eg prayer, worship, Scripture reading, meditation, etc.)? Generally the courts hold to the loose definition given here (D2) in order to protect people's beliefs, but hold to the stricter definition (D1) when actually dealing with sorting out religious sponsorship in government -- obviously, we can't separate beliefs from our government's activity and legislation, but we can separate specific religious beliefs. Courts err on the side of liberty in protecting the citizens in both respects.
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Technorati tags: Religion

Delusions of Delusion

I am no friend of religion. That should come as no surprise to anyone with even a passing familiarity with me or my writing. That said, I feel no regret or compunction in admitting that Taner Edis is saying something I've felt about Sam Harris and Richard Dawkins for a while now (and expressed in my restraint to endorse the latter's new book):

If you want to understand something about real varieties of Islam, not the phantom "Islam" that comes out of a contextless reading of the Quran, there's no alternative to doing some serious studying. I don't mean spending half a lifetime on it—there are a good number of scholars whose job it is to study Islam. They're not all apologists, and they generally have interesting things to say. Read a book or two, and I don't just mean Islam-bashing books. It is, after all, possible to be a critic of Islam without frothing at the mouth in the process.

Indeed, that's part of what's disappointing about garbage like what Sam Harris puts out. He writes as if there is no scholarly work being done on the Quran or Islam at all. He doesn't have to agree with it, but even if he thinks current scholarship about Islam is too apologetic in nature, he has the burden of arguing against academic views. There is no excuse for ignoring it and charging in with quotations from the Quran. As a result, Harris looks like a fool to anyone who has a serious, scholarly interest in Islam. And to the extent that skeptics of religion endorse such rants against an "Islam" very few Muslims would recognize as their religion, we collectively look like morons with an axe to grind.

Although Taner is specifically incensed against Harris' shallow treatment of Islam, I feel the same way about a lot of things I see coming out against Christianity. Honestly, I see in retrospect that a some of my earliest examinations of Christian beliefs were more superficial as these new ones by Harris and Dawkins. An extremely long review by Steve Hays of the Triablogue does root out some of the shallowness with which Dawkins dismisses Christian apologia.

Understand that I actually have the desire to know what is true, to the best of my own abilities. I do not want to prop up shallow scarecrow/strawman claims of Christianity (or any other religion) in order to display my prowess at knocking them down. That's part of why I linked to James Lazarus' post earlier: I agree with him that some of those arguments deserve a deeper look, and a second consideration.

However, C1; the claim that "religious language is meaningless," (I would prefer incoherent/unintelligible/non-veridical), I think remains as a solid argument. I also think that this claim ties in more directly to Dawkins' arguments, and would have buttressed them to make them more solid.

One of Dawkins' major arguments in the book is that it is more rational to believe that complex things come from stepwise, gradual change over time, guided by nautral laws, than to believe that the most complex thing we know of (God) just plain old exists and always has. Now, the reason I say that James' C1 analysis would be of much help here is that the standard definition of God, and the questions of ontology and existence, require a serious look.

James first delves into an analysis of C1 from the perspective of positivism -- the position that dismisses all claims of knowledge which have no basis in either: i) an analytical approach, or ii) observation/empiricism. James immediately deals with the most important rejoinder to positivism, its apparent intrinsic self-refutation -- how can we know the statement, "All reliable knowledge comes via empiricism, observation, or analysis"? Does that, itself, meet its own standard? Of more importance to C1 -- is it not at least theoretically possible for religious claims to be observed and verified? James' conclusion here is, "yes". I agree. Certainly if God wanted to prove itself to us, and decided to spend a few years down here on earth performing obvious miracles, confirming Its own power and goodness, and defying the laws of nature, then the proposition, "God exists," would principally be confirmed according to the demands of positivism.

James next examines the prong of the argument which, I will attempt to show, is not so easy to dismiss:

Smith argues, as Augustinian theologians have in the past, that we cannot describe God in positive language. We can only say what God is not, rather than what God is. However, at the same time, we could only say what God is not if we first had some sort of notion from the beginning about what God actually is. So the attempt to describe God and his characteristics in purely negative terms would collapse into the project of describing God and his characteristics in positive terms, which, according to Smith, is not something that we can do. The conclusion that would purportedly follow from this is that we cannot meaningfully refer to a “God” in our language at all.

James next presents an alternative to the claims of Smith -- some positive definitions of God, as well as some limits to God:

[Smith] could have just as easily described omnipotence as “being able to do whatever it is that is logically possible to do”, which is clearly a positive description. Furthermore, the positive description that I’ve just given is much more in accord with what believers typically believe about the nature of God, in comparison with the definition that Smith gives us. So, from this end, Smith's argument has problems...

The classical view of God as literally infinite in character is no longer accepted by almost all theologians (was it ever predominant, really?), and furthermore the Bible itself describes limits to God's character. For instance, according to the Bible, God cannot lie (Titus 1:2, Hebrews 6:18). Now, Smith might argue that this is simply incoherent. However, it would only be incoherent if we already accepted Smith’s rather shallow analysis of the way in which believers speak and conceive of God. Since they clearly do not speak and conceive of God in the way that Smith lays out, all of his arguments, including this one, fail.

Now we're getting somewhere. What James has done here is attempt to show that the formulations of C1 which depend upon Smith, or at least the way that James has described Smith (I must admit that although I possess the text in question, I have not yet been able to read it), are not wholly sound. I will actually grant him the benefit of the doubt (wrt presenting Smith and analyzing Smith accurately). Given that, I have to agree with him.

However, I do think that a strong case can be made that many aspects of the Christian religion are the equivalent of "square circles", rendering belief in these attributes of God illogical. When theists try to squeeze in some sort of notion that God exists "outside of time and space", for example, but is somehow able to manipulate/create them, we start to get to the crux of where my argument begins, and where it bifurcates from that of Smith. I will get into this more deeply in a future post.

Christianity has gone through numerous revisions and evolution over the past 2000 years, and some very great minds have tackled age-old objections to, and problems with, the faith. When we approach some of the most sacred and orthodox of Christian beliefs, such as prayer, the goodness of God, etc., with the care they require, we are not deluding ourselves into thinking that we've dealt with the best version of their arguments. Believers and unbelievers alike deserve the respect of giving our best shot at evaluating arguments for and against faith in God.

Now, what we ought to separate are serious philosophical investigations from cultural pleas. I think that Dawkins' latest work falls into the latter category, as do the works of Harris. I think there is a place for this sort of thing, and a need for it, and when attempting to influence culture (these men obviously have, for better or worse, as their works skyrocket up the bestseller list), we all recognize the painful truth that works on these subjects must be "dumbed down" to be read widely. In that sense, I understand why Dawkins and Harris write as they do -- they want to influence the masses, and recognize the folly of using a book with extensive footnotes and philosophical verbiage.

But mere cultural competition is something I hope that all persons, of faith or without it, come to detest. I hope that human culture evolves to a level of complexity that books on the subject of religion do their subject justice, and that they can be well and widely-received.

And that's why I said I wasn't going to buy Dawkins' book a while back, not that I don't appreciate the effort.
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Technorati tags: Religion

Uberkuh on Deism

Uberkuh has made an interesting argument concerning Deism and its logical grounding. I responded in his comments section, and wanted to paste the response below. It should be noted first and foremost that I have no particular grievance with a deistic concept of our universe a priori. There are metaphysical considerations, such as the TAG, to consider, and, to the contrariwise, the contingent metaphysical subjectivity of the universe, given deism were true. If someone can make a logically-sound argument that requires I accept an impersonal, unknown deity as a conclusion to the argument, I would give it serious consideration. I do not think deism is stupid, per se. Everything that follows is pasted from the comment, with some links added:

Qualifier: When we make a positive claim, we are expected to have some sort of evidence/knowledge to substantiate and justify the claim.

Do you agree with that qualifier, or not?

It seems that in the case of a Deistic god, given your last few sentences, you may be saying that:

i) information establishes a god

ii) the nature of the big bang/origin of our universe establishes a god

There are atheists out there (I think especially of Francois Tremblay) who would likely tear into these with vigor, dropping epithets like "jackass" and "moron" along the way, to show you that you are wrong. I will not. For one thing, I do think that these two things are interesting (esp ii), but I don't think they work because of how I set up the "qualifier".

I think that both (i) and (ii) are more arguments from ignorance than positive claims, with the possible exception of (i):

Moreover and to be precise, given that space and time are interdependent, neither space nor time would exist in any form without some level of difference both within and between them. Something cannot come from nothing. That is, difference cannot arise from sameness. Difference must come from something different.

Now, I would only say that the premises here are not supported, but merely stated, yet I think I can still follow your argument. Let us consider something preliminary -- the age of the universe and time. [I should also point out that "something cannot come from nothing" applies to a god as well]

When we refer to 13.7 B years, we are actually discussing measurements made on the CMB radiation, recent ones, that basically give us the span of events between the universe's initial expansion and heat and now. That does not mean, however, that there were no events before this, not exactly.

It is only if one assumes that:

iii) space/time/matter all came into existence with the BB

that this holds. I think that assumption is poor for the reason of conservation. The singularity is like peering into complete ignorance, and so trying to claim (iii) is very very difficult [even though I am aware that many scientists do]. All we know is that the universe as it is now came from a very small and very hot state 14 Bya. Certainly, time did not exist in the same way that it does now, and it is likely that matter and energy were not as they are now. However, this does not imply that we can conclude that the expansion was the first event involving the singularity, or (iii). The cyclic universe is gaining academic respect.

Our current universe may not undergo contraction, since it appears to be expanding at an accelerating rate. This does not imply, though, that the singularity was not a sort of "equilibrium" state beyond which we cannot peer, which was the result of an infinite number of cycles and fluxes (net E = 0), that gave rise to this particular universe with its particular fundamental constants.

In short, I would say that (i) is more interesting than (ii) for these reasons -- we cannot establish (iii). Also, this is a sort of defeater for (i), if you consider that the flux between matter and energy has been eternally established. Constant change between states of order and disorder, the latter correlated to "free energy/heat" and the former correlated to "cold matter" seems to be the basis for (i). Being able to differentiate between these states is possible for us, and we know that the 2LoT gives us pause for thought -- but, if the universe is infinite in size, and if the net effect of gravity/attraction of matter will cancel out and equal the net effect of expansion of matter/heat, then we can see that the highly disordered state of the universe as it exists now can continue to collapse into a highly ordered state (leading to another singularity?).

Conclusion: It seems we have very little solid ground upon which to say that we have a knowledge claim, or evidence, that requires (i) or (ii) to be true. Reasonable explanations exist which undercut our confidence in (i) and (ii), and both are almost exactly arguments from ignorance. The ignorance is, "Why are things as they are? What was the earliest state of our universe like? Is our univese infinite in scope wrt time and size?" No one really knows these things.

While I have no personal aversion to the idea of some sort of god, and thus no real motivator to try to destroy any possibility thereof, it just seems the hypothesis is without evidence. As such, I will maintain the same position of skepticism towards god that I hold towards supersymmetry and loop quantum gravity and etc. -- I will wait until we know a little something more, and then re-evaluate my position of unbelief. I have no persuasive grounds upon which to accept claims of the truth of these propositions, nor upon which to prove them false. I can only show that a position of skepticism, witholding belief, is rational and reasonable.
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Technorati tags: God

Nice Resource on Debate re God's Existence

Philoso?hy Talk has a nice episode centered on the God debate. They interview Prof. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (Phil) of Dartmouth, then go out on the streets of Berkeley to talk to people about their beliefs. Here is the audio file (Real Player). [HT: Uberkuh]
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Technorati tags: God

30 Days: Atheist/Xian Update

Remember the 30 Days episode 3 I mentioned? Jon Voisey of The Angry Astronomer blog has some inside information about what happened off-camera. He and Brenda Frei, the atheist on the show, are both in the Society for Open Minded Atheists and Agnostics (SOMA) in Lawrence, Kansas, and he has the scoop. (HT: UTI)

[Brenda] had the 30 Days film crew constantly in her face. Of them, the field producer was reportedly the hardest to deal with. Towards the end of the filming, the field producer revealed that she was a Christian “because she liked opening presents at Christmas.”

What can one say to such unadulterated nonsense?
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Technorati tags: God

Some Food for Thought 10/19/06

1) Creationist "Dr. Dino", aka Kent Hovind, is now on trial (yet again) for his tax evasion. (HT: DftCW). See here and here for my background to the story.
2) James Lazarus has a nice exposition of the Hume's Law inconsistency in applying is-ought. James' conclusion:

We cannot see directly that ‘ought’ cannot be derived from ‘is’, any more than we can see directly that a sound in the attic was not caused by any physical substance in the attic. We do not have the capacity to instantly observe that no ‘is’ proposition cannot ultimately lie at the foundation of every ‘ought’ statement. We can only infer this if the evidence happens to point in that direction, and we have no evidence.

It is fallacious at best to use Hume’s Law itself to defeat anybody who wants to challenge the claim that it is impossible to derive ‘ought’ from ‘is’. Any use of Hume’s Law to prove that Hume’s Law can stand up to such a challenge must beg the question and assume Hume’s Law is true.

3) James also has a nice write-up on why he rejects using some arguments for God's nonexsitence, namely, the following ones (he's an atheist, btw):

C1: Religious language is meaningless.

C2: The notion of God is incoherent.

C3: Theism is an intrinsically worthless hypothesis.

C4: You cannot be reasonable and be a believer.

C5: Theistic hypotheses are the opposite of scientific hypotheses.

C6: The existence of God cannot provide us with any ethical obligations.

C7: The Argument from Physical Minds is a good atheistic argument.

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Technorati tags: God, Philosophy, Creationism