principe nuovo

Steve Hays has responded to my challenge regarding the problem of presuppositionalism and proof-burdens, as well as external evaluation of the veracity of presuppositions themselves, in a post cleverly titled Machiavelli Rises from the Grave. Like Machiavelli, I agree that a new prince, or principe nuovo, has a much tougher job than a prince who is descended from the royal line. The way this ties in is that the TAG is a sort of "new prince", and presuppositionalism (PS) is just the king's kid. While the TAG has to support its premises with argument, we see no such necessity with common, everyday PS.

In PS, one can either have an individually-directed claim, "you cannot account for X", or a generally-directed claim, "atheism cannot account for X", and in neither case is there some sort of burden of proof on the PS to make a real argument. Instead, the PS stands back, folds his arms, and waits for the defender to either have insufficient metaphysical arguments or incoherent ones to critique. End of story.

Steve accused me of trickery in referring to conceptual realism:

i) Does nsfl subscribe to Cocchiarella’s solution? Of is this just one of those blocking maneuvers recommended by Witmer to silence the presuppositionalist if you can’t answer him?

To which I replied:

I find both his forms of conceptual realism (intensional/natural) completely consistent with physicalism as an ontology. As I was reading them (sections 6 and 7, respectively), I found he had put into words what I tried to describe long ago on this blog, when you brought up "pure" conceptualism, in which these abstractions don't exist apart from our minds at all. Therefore, your accusation is refuted by the evidence that I resorted to conceptualism in the past as an explanation of abstract explananda within physicalism.

Steve completely misunderstood this:

“Refuted” by what evidence? Yours or Cocchiarella’s? At the time, I was responding to your formulation, not his—since his formulation wasn’t on the table back then.

I'm referring to the accusation that I'm "employing a trick" via Prof. Witmer's advice by "falling back" to conceptual realism. I'm not claiming his worldview is refuted by my position.

The following exchange is from the newest thread, Steve's words in italics, mine blockquoted:

My purpose was to defend my own presupposition that physicalism is not incompatible with logic. Would you concede that conceptual realism is the solution? Do you admit that there is nothing absurd or incoherent in holding to physicalism and to one of Cocchiarella's forumulations for the explanandum of logic?
Presuppositionalism claims that all alternative worldviews are inherently and intrinsically self-defeating. Can you show this for someone who subscribes to physicalism and to conceptual intensional realism?

No, I wouldn’t concede any such thing.

1.He says that “as a socio-biological theory of the human capacity for language and though, conceptualism must presuppose some form of natural realism as the causal ground of that capacity.”

But this is circular reasoning. He first classifies conceptualism as a “socio-biological” theory, then says it must presuppose some form of natural realism. That may be a valid inference, given the classification, but he does nothing to justify his naturalistic classification in the first place.

So are you saying that humans can have language and thought without any natural grounding? Human thought and language do not supervene upon natural processes: chemistry, physics, matter...? Is he supposed to instead presuppose the existence of the immaterial spirit, and deny that thought or language (as we know them) supervene upon the physical? And if he did that, and said, "Conceptualism is a spiritual theory, which presupposes some form of supernaturalism..." is that not the same circular issue?

2.He then says “As universals that can be realized indifferent places at the same time and that might have no instances at all in the world, natural properties and relations are not in the world the way that concrete objects are, nor can they be considered to have an ‘objectual’ nature in any sense as well…the unsaturated mode of being of natural properties and relations…[is] somehow analogous to the mode of being of concepts. Thus, just as predicable concepts do not exist independently of the human capacity for language and concept-formation, so too natural properties and relations[s] do not exist independently of the causal structure of the world.

Several basic problems:

a) He admits the existence of unexemplified universals: “might have no instances at all in the world.”

How is that possible if the world is all there is?

Are you claiming that "unicorn-ness" and "Lochness monsterism" must be instantiated?

b) He then attempts to find a nook for them by claiming that the “unsaturated” mode of being of natural properties an relations is “somehow analogous” to the mode of being of concepts.

But this is an argument from analogy minus the argument? How does he unpack the “somehow”? He doesn’t. Just his sheer dictum.

c) Moreover, even if there were an analogy, it’s only as good as the analogue which supplies the point of reference. He claims that predicable concepts don’t exist independently of human concept-formation.

But that, again, is a raw assertion rather than a reasoned argument. Why should I accept the claim which undergirds the analogy?

So he fails on both counts. He (i) gives us an argument from analogy minus the argument. And he also (ii) fails to argue for the underlying analogue.

3. He then says:

“abstract objects…according to conceptual Platonism, ‘exist’ in a realm that transcends space, time and causality, and therefore that ‘preexist’ the evolution of consciousness…In conceptual intensional realism, on the other hand, the dependence is not merely epistemological but ontological as well.”

But if abstract universals are causally dependent on the evolution of consciousness, then this will collapse back into the “ontology of conceptual idealism,” which is what he was trying to avoid—and for good reason.

They are ontologically dependent upon the substance of matter, which is the substance upon which consciousness supervenes.

Why do you think he is avoiding conceptual idealism? He is a Christian, a Catholic priest.

a) If abstract universals like the laws of logic are causally dependent on the evolution of consciousness, then they lose their necessity and universality. They become descriptive rather than prescriptive or proscriptive. They can no longer distinguish logical reasoning from illogical reasoning, for they take human consciousness as their point of reference and point of departure.

b) Likewise, if abstract universals such as mathematical truths are causally dependent on the evolution of consciousness, then the universe did not exemplify any mathematical properties or relations prior to the evolution of consciousness.

In that case, the universe is evolving in relation to human evolution. The existence and structure of physical universe is, to that degree, causally dependent on human evolution.

c) Likewise, if mathematical abstracta are causally dependent on the evolution of human consciousness, then there can be no such thing as an actual infinite in math. You are thereby committed to finitism in math. But that is prey to a number of familiar criticisms.

Continuing with my own thoughts:

One could argue against this necessity in a few different ways, since as Walker points out, these transcendentals are "objective, prescriptive and metaphysically ultimate". I am thinking that Scripture cannot meet this requirement, nor special revelation generally…When Xians argue that the Scriptures provide for us an OPMU for morality, how does this fare through Walker's filter?… I would argue that this consideration presents a substantial challenge to the claim that OPMU morality can be based upon divine revelation via Scripture. It seems that the criteria cannot be met in an attitude-independent fashion, given the errant supposed copies we have of an OPMU moral law.

Morgan simply confuses the order of knowing with the order of being. Moral “transcendentals” can be objective, prescriptive and metaphysically ultimate” even though our mode of epistemic access is not ontological objective or metaphysically ultimate.

And if our mode of epistemic access is neither ontological[ly] objective nor metaphysically ultimate, then from what position can you argue for their truth in these two areas? It seems like I could say that there is some phenomenon, X, that is OPMU. However, if I cannot access it epistemically in any OPMU fashion, then where is the argument that you can establish X as OPMU? Is it not necessary to have a complete and thorough knowledge of X in order to argue X is OPMU?

How do you know X?

How do you know X is OPMU?

What’s a transcendental argument? How do you mount such an argument? Good questions.

Although TAG is an indirect argument inasmuch as you are arguing for the existence of God by arguing from certain undeniable phenomena, the argument(s) for the identity of these phenomena as well as their theistic dependence will take the form of direct argumentation.

James Anderson has also disassembled the Van Tilian version of TAG into several subarguments.

http://www.proginosko.com/docs/IfKnowledgeThenGod.pdf

And these could be developed in more detail.

Interlocuter has responded to some of Anderson's arguments, which are good ones.

Oddly enough, Paul Manata has admitted that the "development" of the TAG from the PS position is not only premature for such an ability (to use it as an indirect argument for God), but he has admitted that it is only an assertion.

He points out that:
i) If X, then God
ii) X
iii) Therefore God

Supporting premise (i) is the problem, of course. Prof. Witmer talked about this a bit on Unchained Radio with Gene Cook.
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Technorati tags: God, Religion, Philosophy, Intelligent Design, Evolution, Creationism --

Steve Hays Responds to Prof. Witmer re Presuppositionalism

Steve Hays has weighed in on Prof. Witmer's response to PS. In a recent post entitled Machiavellian Atheology, Steve spends a great deal of time complaining that Prof. Witmer chooses to take a tactical perspective, focusing on debate, rather than addressing more of the substantive philosophical issues (in Steve's opinion). Of course, Prof. Witmer admits the purpose of his talk is largely in how to "respond" to those who present the PS in debate formats.

One of the things that I think will prove problematic is the issue of how the burden of proof is established in these PS arguments. The PS's claim that only internal critiques are valid to evaluate the coherence of worldviews. They also claim that there is "no neutral common ground" -- that the employment of logic/morality/etc., presupposes the Christian God.

So if they claim these things, how is it that they can establish, as Steve comments below, and as CalvinDude repeats numerous times (most recently here), what levels of justification are required to presuppose something, whether or not some things may be viewed as primitive and little explained? This seems a serious issue. I await a serious reply.

Steve writes [I'll add in a few links]:

At the time I was busy with other things, so I’ll now take the occasion to revisit that issue.

I'm glad Steve did, and I hope we can continue to discuss general presuppositionalism, as well as the question of whether or not theism is a necessary precondition of logic.

I would note, in passing, that Witmer freely concedes that Manata handily won his debate with Barker:

I think most impartial people would agree. I did, long ago (back in August, if I recall).

Exposition aside, Witmer’s presentation is a combination of a few substantive objections along with a lot of tactical advice. These are somewhat interrelated, but, for clarity of analysis, I’ll make some effort to address them separately. Let’s address the substantive objections first:

This talk was limited to one hour, and much of what he said was contained in the transcript that was made available. However, some of the peripheral issues that were discussed, especially in the following Q&A session, were not incorporated into his talk. He has told me, though, that he plans to revisit the issue in a while when he gets sufficient feedback and time.

That’s a valid criticism of one particular formulation of presuppositionalism. But this is easily rectified by scaling back the claim to a more reasonable burden of proof. The onus is not on the presuppositionalist to rebut every conceivable alternative to the faith. That would be an inhuman burden of proof. And it would saddle him with a double standard, for no one, whether believer or unbeliever, can meet such a hypothetical challenge.

One of the first points to make is that there is a fundamental difference between an individual-directed negative argument (IDNA): "you cannot account for X", a generalized negative argument (GNA): "atheism cannot account for X", and a generalized positive argument (GPA): "God is required to account for X". I have seen all three go under the guise of presuppositionalism.

True, when it comes to arguing for one’s own position or against a competing position, both sides have their own burden of proof to discharge.

But this is where things get problematic. If you are only making an "internal critique", then the question of how we establish a "burden of proof" that translates across both my own and your own worldviews, and meets our presuppositional standards, is difficult to answer. If I assert some specific premise, such as, "All claims must be substantiated via the scientific method," then you can obviously use that sort of hasty, generalized premise against my other premises, since I have established a metric for the burden of proof. What if I do not think a simple metric can be used, and that different levels of proof are required as we correlate to those things inside of and outside of generalized human experience and induction?

This is a valid criticism as far as it goes. Presuppositionalists can be guilty of substituting slogans for arguments. Paraphrasing the original claim.

Or considering a negative argument the same thing as a positive one.

However, this doesn’t mean that no such answers exist. There are book-length treatments on modal metaphysics from a theistic perspective which go into excruciating detail.

And I see this as a problem for both IDNA and GNA formulations of presuppositionalism. Rarely do these two ever interact with parallel treatments of metaphysics, ontology or logic from either a God-neutral, or atheistic perspective.

Here he’s transitioning from substantive objections to tactical advance. And notice, in the course of this transition, how he’s forgotten where he himself positioned the burden of proof?

I think he's pointing out that we all hold presuppositions, and that anyone who thinks otherwise is deluded. He's asking why "accounts" have to be given for presuppositions themselves, since your presuppositions cannot be properly "accounted for" either -- definitionally, these are assumed truths which form the basis of our starting points to make arguments.

His advice takes the form of: “You think we’ve gotta problem? Well, you’ve gotta problem too!”

I don't think he's committing the tu quoque fallacy. He's pointing out that this is a flaw in the PS strategy -- to imply an infinite regress, tautological difficulties, primitive facts, or circularity will not result if we justify what we presuppose, ad naseum.

But this is an attempt to flip the burden of proof rather than discharge the burden of proof. To say that unbeliever doesn’t have to justify induction on secular grounds because the believer has unwarranted beliefs as well—even assuming that this is true—is not an intellectually responsible answer. It’s fair to point out that the believer has his own burden of proof to meet. But that doesn’t shift the burden of proof from the unbeliever to the believer.

Again, I think he's addressing the necessity of "unburdening" everyone at the level of presuppositions and primitive facts.

The onus is still on the unbeliever to justify induction on secular grounds. The onus doesn’t go away just because he can claim that the believer has failed to meet his own burden of proof.

No, but if the PS argument is that the unbeliever has failed to meet the unbeliever's own burden of proof, and the PS argument is all about "internal critique", then this gets tricky to claim, doesn't it? This is what he addresses later on.

For another thing, even if these beliefs were about the same thing, both sides would bear their respective burden of proof. The onus is on the believer to justify induction on Christian grounds while the onus is on the unbeliever to justify induction on secular grounds.

But in so doing, how many other assumptions do you, or we, package in? How much of a regress will we get into? Typically PSs claim they have two assumptions: i) God exists (where God = all good, powerful, knowing, not a liar, etc.); ii) Scripture is God's Word. They then feel consistent in falling back on (i) and (ii) in order to discharge their own burden of proof re induction. I typically hear induction "defended" by Scriptures like Gen 8:22 (KJV) --

While the earth remaineth, seedtime and harvest, and cold and heat, and summer and winter, and day and night shall not cease.

But this assumes many things, especially that all of these things will remain *as they are*, in addition to just "not ceasing". That is, God would not be a liar, per se, if days became 29 hours and nights 5 hours, or if summer was 9 months long, and winter 9 months long. What the reader assumes (unjustifiably) is that induction is strengthened by this primitive verse, when there is no way to find support here without serious other leaps in logic. Some of the other assumptions include the translation of the verse, the choice of the MSS, the hermeneutics, etc., etc.

So, my point is that as much as PS advocates may believe they can always fall back onto these basic internal assumptions, especially when they do metaphysical apologia, they cannot. Too many other considerations are packaged into (ii) to allow that.

Even if the believer was guilty of shirking his side of the argument, that would’t prove that the uvbeliever was right.

Correct, because of tu quoque.

The problem with all this is that it’s so transparently cynical and unprincipled.

Cynical, perhaps; unprincipled? Hardly.

The unbeliever is entitled to take some things for granted “if” he has good reason to take these things for granted. The unbeliever is entitled to treat certain facts as primitive facts if they are primitive facts, and he has good reason for believing so. The unbeliever is entitled to say, “they just are, and that’s that,” only “if,” as a matter of fact, that’s a truthful claim.

Well that's not "for granted" then, is it? Care to tell me what "good reason" you have to believe that other minds exist? How do you show that this is a truthful claim? Besides, the whole basis of the PS argument is that internal critiques are all we can do. How do you inject into my worldview the "burden of proof" and the prerequisites for presuppositions? See the problem, here? You claim there is "no neutral ground". But you also claim you can neutrally evaluate my justification for presuppositions? That's where we get into classical foundationalism, or coherentism, etc., which is where theism and atheism will quickly find some issues.

The unbeliever is only entitled to revert to atheistic Platonism as his last-ditch stand if that fallback maneuver is actually true or he has good reason for believing it’s true.

Or perhaps the atheist realizes his own ability to respond to a IDNA is predicated upon that which he is committed to, and how familiar he is with the metaphysics thereof. Saying that the universals are metaphysically possible or impossible within a physicalist framework is one thing; accepting it as a presupposition is another; demonstrating it is quite a whole different story.

I have attempted to show (here, here) that conceptual intensional/natural realism is not inconsistent with physicalism to "account for" the laws of logic, and universals in particular.

Platonism, conversely, is parallel to theism in some ways -- it removes verifiability principles from the ball game, and makes non-veridical statements a matter of rule rather than exceptions. Talk of transcendent, universal, abstractions, existing outside of the spatio-temporal framework of our universe, sounds just about like God, doesn't it?

And, of course, if that’s what he thought all along, then he wouldn’t “revert” to atheistic Platonism, now would he?

Many people who are pressed by PS debates into commitments ought not overcommit to things they don't understand, myself included. His point is that metaphysical defenses of our worldviews are not simple, and that if one commits to physicalism and is shown they don't properly conceive of how to incorporate morality, values or logic or etc., the *best* thing to do is not dismiss values, logic and morality, (obviously) but instead to change their commitment to a particular metaphysic. This isn't dishonest. He's pointing to the relative priority of core presuppositions versus ontological commitment.

The unbeliever is entitled to be noncommittal if he is, indeed, truly noncommittal, and has good reason to be a minimalist.

But how does an externalist critique verify "good reason"? Same problem, over and over and over...

But that Witmer is saying throughout this section is that an unbeliever should make opportunistic use of any blocking maneuver or evasive maneuver whether he believes it or not. He is coaching the unbeliever on how to win the debate without winning the argument. How to lose on the merits, but survive intact. It’s pretty revealing that Witmer would resort to such unscrupulous counsel.

How to keep ones wits about the debate -- that jettison of one's faculties, morality, etc., is not the end result of "losing". At best, someone can defend themselves adequately from an IDNA, and deflect the criticism of internal incoherence by demonstration. At worst, someone can be shown by IDNA that some of their presuppositions conflict with their explanations -- what should "give"? The fundamentals? No. The explanations.

Use any old argument, good or bad, just to get the presuppositionalist off your back! The convenience, and not the cogence, of the argument is all that matters.

It can sound that way, but remember that he is indeed referring to a debate strategy, and he calls it such. On the other hand, he points out the flaws in the arguments of PS (which you addressed in the beginning), and gives advice on responding along substantive lines throughout the talk.

On another subject, nsfl also refers us to an article by Nino Cocchiarella on “Logic & Ontology.”

I have been looking around for a few months for an online, free resource that I could reference to try to describe how logic/morality/etc. can be incorporated into physicalism. This was the best I've yet found. Prof. Witmer recommended some books I put on reserve at the library, but they're not due back until 12/4.

i) Does nsfl subscribe to Cocchiarella’s solution? Of is this just one of those blocking maneuvers recommended by Witmer to silence the presuppositionalist if you can’t answer him?

I find both his forms of conceptual realism (intensional/natural) completely consistent with physicalism as an ontology. As I was reading them (sections 6 and 7, respectively), I found he had put into words what I tried to describe long ago on this blog, when you brought up "pure" conceptualism, in which these abstractions don't exist apart from our minds at all. Therefore, your accusation is refuted by the evidence that I resorted to conceptualism in the past as an explanation of abstract explananda within physicalism.

ii) Cocchiarella discusses the three standard theories of universals, and opts for a synthetic solution: conceptual realism.

With two subtle distinctions: conceptual intensional realism, and conceptual natural realism. I am working on a blog post to put up at DC and my own site on this topic.

I myself also opt for a synthetic solution: theistic conceptual realism. Cocchiarella confronts me with a false dilemma, for I favor an option which isn’t even on the list. Therefore, Cocchiarella hasn’t boxed me into accepting his solution. And, for reasons I won’t go into at the moment, I don’t accept his solution.

Steve, the point of my quoting this reference was not to box you into a dilemma, but to extricate myself from the accusation of being in one. My purpose was to defend my own presupposition that physicalism is not incompatible with logic. Would you concede that conceptual realism is the solution? Do you admit that there is nothing absurd or incoherent in holding to physicalism and to one of Cocchiarella's forumulations for the explanandum of logic?

Presuppositionalism claims that all alternative worldviews are inherently and intrinsically self-defeating. Can you show this for someone who subscribes to physicalism and to conceptual intensional realism?

Christian Presuppositionalism - A General Response

Many of my readers [and I'm happy to report decent traffic recently -- from 19 to 40 unique visitors each day in the last week, well, that's good for me ;)] may be familiar with the style of apologetics known as Christian Presuppositionalism (CPS). In general, it argues against all other worldviews via reductio, or internal critique. One of the favorite sorts of positive arguments that CPS employ are the Transcendental Arguments for God's Existence (TAG) [also see here]. These all run along the same lines (If X, then God):

i) God is a precondition for X
ii) X exists
iii) Therefore, God exists
(X = logic, uniformity of nature, induction, morality, mathematical truths, universals...)

My student freethought group, AAFSA at UF, enjoys a hell of a faculty advisor -- a philosopher who specializes in religion and metaphysics. Prof. D. Gene Witmer is a pretty well-known guy in the world of physicalism (so far as I can tell from his numerous citations in academic works on the subject), and he teaches a phil of religion course every year, PHI 3700.

I attended a PhilSoc meeting in March where Prof. Witmer discussed the problem of evil, after which I asked him how he would respond to Van Tillian Presuppositionalists (from C. Van Til) on the PoE. He seemed taken aback, and had no idea what in the hell I was talking about. I later came to find out that this is because the CPS ideas are basically absent from awareness in academic circles (at least at secular universities). Following this, we exchanged quite a few emails discussing CPS, and I suppose I piqued his interest into the arguments and methods employed by CPS's.

On Sept. 26, I asked Prof. Witmer if he would talk to our group, and we discussed possible topics a bit before he decided to talk about CPS at our meeting 9. I have now made the abstract of the talk, and the full-text (.pdf) of his presentation available online. Please download and feel free to comment on his arguments and major points. I especially enjoyed his presentation of a "conditional PoE", wherein he argues that either there are moral facts or there aren't, but either way, the PoE shows that God does not exist.

Download the .pdf HERE.
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Technorati tags: Philosophy

Presuppositionalism

Taking on presuppositionalism (PS) gained Gene Witmer fame and fortune! Well, at least the former, but the latter is surely on the way.

BTW, I'm the guy at the PhilSoc meeting who brought up the question that led him to write the paper and do the talk. He also did a radio spot as a result of those.

If you aren't familiar with PS, see this comparative anatomy of apologetic methods by a PS proponent.

Prof. Witmer on Unchained Radio

Prof. Witmer's talk on Christian Presuppositionalism (.pdf of talk) caught the attention of Gene Cook, who runs "Unchained Radio", a Christian radio show that promotes this quasi-philosophy. They invited Prof. Witmer to call in on their "atheist hour" they have every week, and he graciously obliged. Download the .mp3 and listen for yourself.

I'll be printing up a partial transcript to highlight the best parts of the dialogue, and will link back to it here.
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Technorati tags: presuppositionalism

My Posts at Debunking Christianity

The following are all of my contributions to Debunking Christianity thus far. Last rev. 4-23-08

[oldest to newest]

1. My Story (Sat, 3-18-06) -- introductory post, includes testimony and explanation for deconversion


2. "This is Your Brain...on God" (Wed, 4-12-06) -- reflection on studies in neuroscience that posit [and evidence] a physical basis for religious experiences


3. Atheism and Evangelism (Fri, 4-14-06) -- juxtaposes the "right" of theists to evangelize, based on their motives, against our right as atheists to "deconvert" and advocate the abandonment of faith


4. Question: Does Religiosity Correlate Strongly to Charity? (Sun, 4-23-06) -- response to question #1 posed by Kaffinator


5. Question: Does Faith or Religious Activity Improve Health? (Sun, 4-23-06) -- response to question #2 posed by Kaffinator


6. Probability of Cognitive Dissonance = 1/0 (Sun, 4-30-06) -- comment on Swinburne, and his calculation of the probability of God’s existence, incarnation, resurrection as Jesus, etc.


7. The Sad State of Science (Wed, 5-3-06) -- comment on the 2006 Science and Engineering Indicators, especially reflects the correlation between poor science education and superstitious thought/belief


8. There is no Jehovah-Rophi, no Covenant (Wed, 5-3-06) -- investigates the promises of the old and new covenants, particularly with respect to health/healing, and concludes that either God is a liar, or there is no Covenant (and never was)
   


9. Swine and Science (Thur, 5-11-06) -- A response to Steve at the Triablogue regarding ex nihilo creation and my relative silliness at attempting to "talk science" with those who incur miracles at any needed opportunity


10. Do the Ends Justify the Means? (Tue, 5-16-06) -- throws out two instances where Paul appears to imply that they ends justify the means, if the means include subtle deception. The major crux of this post was encountered in the comments section, as we discussed where Paul blurred ethics as he had Timothy circumcised and participated in a Nazarite vow


11. America and Christian Nationalism (Wed, 5-24-06) -- links to some recent articles on theonomy/theocracy and related topics, basically an open thread for comments and arguments


12. Paul Kurtz, "Why I Am A Skeptic About Religious Claims" (Thur, 5-25-06) -- Paul Kurtz, editor in chief of Free Inquiry, professor emeritus of philosophy at the State University of New York at Buffalo, and the chair of the Center for Inquiry, has a featured article in this month's issue, "Why I Am A Skeptic About Religious Claims". One of Paul's aims is to examine the reasons for skepticism, but another is to provide us with a new working label to use to avoid the stigma of "atheist" without falling into the overly-general "skeptic".


13. I Feel Jeebus (Tue, 6-27-06) A bunch of drama involving the Triablogue's defense of Frank Walton. Not worth your read, no atheological material here.


14. Ashamed of Their Ancestry (Wed, 7-05-06) Examining the oft-repeated claim [not much of an argument] that the process of evolution intrinsically undermines reason.


15. The Antithesis of Our Values (Tue, 7-18-06), A response to Steve Hays' post "Answer a Fool According to His Folly", in which he attempts to Biblically justify and defend his acerbic manner of dealing with unbelievers. Written while I was in Buffalo, NY.


16. Not "Answering A Fool According to His Folly" (Tue, 7-18-06) Steve tries to falsify my last post about mutual respect by quoting anonymous unbelievers on a public forum who insult Christians -- a pretty silly endeavor. Written while I was in Buffalo, NY.


17. More Chain Pulling for the Anti-Intellectualist Right (Fri, 8-18-06) My thoughts on an article in the American Family Association Journal, "Colleges Turn Left, Students Think That's Right," which concludes: "what students and parents don’t realize is that today’s campuses are functioning as an indoctrination into the realm of liberalism."


18. Oh My Sweet...Lord! (Tue, 8-22-06) Humor. Highlighting the "Armor of God PJs".


19. There IS Reason to Hope (Mon, 8-28-06) A response to recent studies that show trends in secularism among youths in Australia and Spain.


20. Godlessness Rare Behind Bars (Sat, 9-2-06) I saw two articles on the relative proportion of atheists in prisons versus religious groups, and I thought the results worth sharing.


21. A Little Levity (Wed, 10-4-06) Top Ten Reasons Religion is Like Pornography [humor]


22. Journal Article Researching Deconversion (Wed, 10-11-06) I briefly review a journal article by Heinz Streib studying deconversion experiences.


23. Christian Presuppositionalism, a General Response (Wed, 10-11-06) On Sept. 26, I asked Prof. Witmer if he would talk to our group, and we discussed possible topics a bit before he decided to talk about CPS at our meeting 9. I have now made the abstract of the talk, and the full-text (.pdf) of his presentation available online. Please download and feel free to comment on his arguments and major points. I especially enjoyed his presentation of a "conditional PoE", wherein he argues that either there are moral facts or there aren't, but either way, the PoE shows that God does not exist.


24. Richard Dawkins Interviewed on the Colbert Report (Wed, 10-18-06)Best opening line, ever: "My guest tonight is a scientist who argues there is no God...and you know what? He'll have an eternity in hell to prove it!" Get the QuickTime .mov video from the RichardDawkins.net site or see the interview at YouTube.


25. Nice Resource on Debate re God's Existence (Sun, 10-22-06) Philoso?hy Talk has a nice episode centered on the God debate. They interview Prof. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (Phil) of Dartmouth, then go out on the streets of Berkeley to talk to people about their beliefs. Here is the audio file (Real Player). [HT: Uberkuh]


26. Steve Hays Responds to Prof. Witmer re Presuppositionalism (Sat, 10-28-06) Steve Hays has weighed in on Prof. Witmer's response to PS. In a recent post entitled Machiavellian Atheology, Steve spends a great deal of time complaining that Prof. Witmer chooses to take a tactical perspective, focusing on debate, rather than addressing more of the substantive philosophical issues (in Steve's opinion).


27. Haggard Resigns Amidst Allegations of Gay Sex (Fri, 11-3-06) Following the story as it broke


28. Responding to ID -- A Review of Their Positive Arguments with Rebuttals (Fri, 11-17-06) I want to lay out a fair representation of the positive case for intelligent design (ID) in this article, and examine why the case has been ruled a failure by the greater scientific community.


29. Carnival of the Godless 53 (Fri, 11-17-06) I compiled 34 submissions and showcased 10 posts here at DC for the COTG.

Last rev. 4-23-08

Presuppositionalism summarized

I said a long time ago, in a debate with a presuppositionalist (PS) named CalvinDude, that the PS request for an atheist to give an "account" of logic (in the sense of justifying the use of, or explaining the metaphysical concept of, with the possibility that it was unjustified) was retarded, for the very reason that in doing so, one must assume that logic was valid. See here for a more articulate dismissal of PS based on that issue. And see here for the point that there is a fundamental misunderstanding on the part of PS proponents in trying to ask us to "justify" logic at all.

I also said a long time ago that the entire apologetic method of PS was simply not an argument at all, but a ridiculous burden that naive people place on other naive people. See here for that issue revisited. What people "arguing" for PS are actually doing is asking you to write a textbook on metaphysics and epistemology in order to thoroughly explain logic. But if you fail to do this, how does this prove anything about their positive claim for God's existence? It doesn't. Not even in the slightest.

Instead, all it does is give them the opportunity to try to find some mistake in your textbook(s), which is usually not hard to do, unless you're a genius philosopher, and thus you spend hours and hours carefully constructing arguments for no reason at all except to prove that logic is valid.

Wow.

On the other hand, they just sit back and basically do nothing to advance the idea that logic presupposes God's existence. Instead, all they have "on their side" is that a crude material reductionism, if attempted by an atheist, will fail to properly explain abstracta like concepts and mathematical entities and logical relations and properties. So basically just don't try to reduce those things to matter, and the PS literally has nothing to argue about!

Something I've Been Slow to Realize re: Denialism

That you shouldn't waste your time trying to rationally argue with them:

...some ground rules. We don't argue with cranks. Part of understanding denialism is knowing that it's futile to argue with them, and giving them yet another forum is unnecessary. They also have the advantage of just being able to make things up and it takes forever to knock down each argument as they're only limited by their imagination while we're limited by things like logic and data. Recognizing denialism also means recognizing that you don't need to, and probably shouldn't argue with it. Denialists are not honest brokers in the debate (you'll hear me harp on this a lot). They aren't interested in truth, data, or informative discussion, they're interested in their world view being the only one, and they'll say anything to try to bring this about. We feel that once you've shown that what they say is deceptive, or prima-facie absurd, you don't have to spend a graduate career dissecting it and taking it apart. It's more like a "rule-of-thumb" approach to bad scientific argument. That's not to say we won't discuss science or our posts with people who want to honestly be informed, we just don't want to argue with cranks. We have work to do.

When you are honestly interested in the truth about scientific matters, you are forced to do serious leg work and research to unearth factual data to support your position and refute the other person's, whereas they can simply distort data at will, then fall back on pure faith and presuppositionalism if that fails. Perfect examples include creationists of all stripes.

Recently, I contacted a certain egnorant creationist MD whose challenge to produce quantitative measurement of genetic information I met. I dug up papers that specifically provided what he was asking for, and I sent him the links to them. This was painstaking, as was photocopying them then scanning them in as PDF files. I was very polite in my email, explaining that his question / argument from incredulity really made him look somewhat silly since this very topic was addressed 40-odd years ago in detail in a rigorous and formal fashion.

How did he repay me? By threatening me with a lawsuit if I contacted him again or if I mentioned his name on a public forum.

Fu@#ing cowardly lying puke. Not interested one iota in the truth of the matter, only in contributing to the lies and confusion put out by the Disco Institute in their endless quest to lie for Jebus.

Here are some of the papers, in particular, that address his bogus "refutation" of evolution (warning - #1, 7, 8 are very large files):

1. Natural selection as the process of accumulating genetic information in adaptive evolution, M. Kimura (1961)
2. Rate of Information Acquisition by a Species subjected to Natural Selection, D.J.C. MacKay
3. Evolution of biological information, T.D. Schneider
4. The fitness value of information, C.T. Bergstrom and M. Lachmann
5. Review of W. Dembski’s No Free Lunch, J. Shallit
6. The Evolution and Understanding of Hierarchical Complexity in Biology from an Algebraic Perspective, C.L. Nehaniv and J.L. Rhodes
7. On the Increase in Complexity in Evolution, P.T. Saunders and M.W. Ho (1976)
8. On the Increase in Complexity in Evolution II: The Relativity of Complexity and the Principle of Minimum Increase, P.T. Saunders and M.W. Ho (1981)
   

Here are the five common tactics espoused by denialists of all types:

5 general tactics are used by denialists to sow confusion. They are conspiracy, selectivity (cherry-picking), fake experts, impossible expectations (also known as moving goalposts), and general fallacies of logic.

Oh am I ever familiar with each of these. Unfortunately. And I learned this slowly, after argument upon argument in which I appealed to reason and evidence in the unflinching face of denial.
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Technorati tags: Religion, Politics, Philosophy, Intelligent Design, Evolution, Creationism

Existential fallacies

The other night I was watching basketball and drinking beer with a smart theist friend of mine. He knows I'm an atheist and we enjoy banter on philosophy and religion. When the topic moved to existentialism, and we discussed the meaning and value of human life, I pointed out that what people believed about the value of their life became, it seemed, the actual value of their life. If theists believe that God has a plan for their life, it doesn't matter that they have no idea what it is, or whether or not God values them more highly than anyone around them, that is enough to suffice to convince them their lives are valuable. I also mentioned the postmodern view that man is free to create his own meaning and value in life.

His response was something along the lines of, "But this isn't ultimately meaningful." I asked him if his love for his wife was ultimately meaningful. He replied, "Perhaps not, but love itself is ultimate." The other night when I was discussing the problem of evil with a room full of Christians, another fellow made this same fact-value error (and, maybe, a fallacy of composition) in stating, "Your emotions are just atoms!" I pointed out to him that it would grieve him very much if I slung some atoms of lead into his body, although they were "just atoms"...

It seems that the terms "ultimate" and "absolute" are often misused in religious apologetics, in particular, as well as complaints that materialism logically necessitates a lack of value. The informal fallacy that is often committed is equivocating on the fact-value distinction between something being meaningful or valuable versus its being everlasting or infinite in terms of duration. Mysteriously, there is also some value assumed to be intrinsic to things that are immaterial, or at least are not composed only of material substances. I have two good quotes:

1) Chris Hallquist, reviewing Craig's Reasonable Faith, writes:

The first subheading reads "No Ultimate Meaning Without Immortality and God." The immortality part has something like an argument:

If each individual person passes out of existence when he dies, then what ultimate meaning can be given to his life? Does it really matter whether he existed at all? It might be said that his life was important because it influenced others or affected the course of history. But this only shows a relative significance to his life, not an ultimate significance. His life may be important relative to certain other events, but what is the ultimate significance of any of those events? If all the events are meaningless, then what can be the ultimate meaning of influencing any of them. Ultimately it makes no difference.[11]

Craig seems to be doing one of two possible things here. On the one hand, he seems to be equivocating between two different senses of the word "ultimate"--namely between "what eventually happens to a thing" and "what really matters." Alternatively, he seems to be making an argument containing the hidden premise that the value of a thing depends entirely upon what eventually happens to that thing. If the former, Craig is committing a classic informal fallacy; if the latter, he is making an unsupported and dubious assumption. The latter implies an infinite regress: If each moment is given meaning only by the next, then the next moment must be given meaning by the moment after it, and so on ad infinitum.

2) Gene Witmer, talking about presuppositionalism as an apologetic method, writes (p.10):

Note, incidentally, the constant use of "absolute." This is one of those terms philosophically naive people love to throw around. It's very, very unclear what it means. Sometimes it is used just for emphasis "Is this a table? Yes. Yes, absolutely!" Sometimes it is used to mean "unqualified", as in "absolutely no exceptions!" But neither of these fit the way it's used here, and I venture to say that it really doesn't mean anything clear at all. [more on PS here and here]

I recognize how long it has taken me to see the non sequitur between saying that something lasts forever versus saying that this property automatically renders a thing with value, or the lack of this property nullifies the value of a thing. As I read more about meaning and value in life I hope to see more things like this more clearly.

A brief comment on presuppositionalism

An old friend of mine wrote me and told me about finding something negative (I'm not linking) about me via a web search for atheism. Hint: it involves Frank Walton.

I was reminded in looking at Frank's site of how pathetic he really is, which led to me remembering when I actually used to waste time arguing with people like him, the Triabloguers and other presuppositionalists. They waste such time by doing something simple: conflating strict reductionist physicalism/materialism with atheism.

When one begins with the fundamental presupposition that God has spoken in the Scriptures in Christ’s Law-word, you are left with the only worldview that can consistently allow for immaterial, universal, and abstract things like laws of science, laws of logic, and abstract concepts.

Funny, I thought there were numerous metaphysical ways to describe universals, properties and relations besides "Jesus"...

As has been pointed out before, the absurd burden of proof which these guys place on themselves requires them to show how every other explanation in metaphysics is logically inconsistent. Quite a tall order, given that brilliant philosophers have spent centuries thinking about these things. Instead, they use a simple straw man wherein atheists must be strict materialists who cannot embrace nominalism or conceptualism or any other theory of universals.

In addition, they hold that internal critiques are all that can be done "across worldviews" because of different presuppositions, but then proceed to contradict that by saying that certain basic beliefs are not justified within other worldviews (i.e., that logic is self-evident and incorrigible, that morality is about causing harm, &c.)

On "Way of the Master Radio" with Todd Friel

Out of boredom and curiosity, I called in to Way of the Master Radio on Friday evening. The host, Todd Friel, will be debating Eddie in Daytona Beach on 3/26, and I'm hoping he'll be able to come here the day before to do our debate. He's one of the last on my list as potential opponents.

I called in as "David" from Tampa, 23, at UF studying chemistry. I simply used a pseudonym because I wasn't sure how the show would go -- if he would be hostile, if he would even air my segment. I was also a little insecure about being live on air, and I've never debated live on-air before, so I wanted to see how it went. Only the beginning of my call was captured at the very end of the second hour of Friday's show, but he taped the rest of it and promised to air it later (on Monday, I suppose). You can listen to the last 2 minutes of the show here and catch me being welcomed on.

___*UPDATE*___

He did indeed put it on Monday's show, hour 2. You can listen to it here. My segment with him starts about 40 minutes in. He did a lot of editing of the show, which doesn't surprise me very much, and it is hard to tell, but he is actually jumping in and out of the show with explanations, and cutting out parts, rather than just letting it all play.

For instance, he completely omitted the part about cosmology and how the Standard Model = "something from nothing," where I corrected him and called him on equivocation.

One big thing that Todd messes up badly is the idea that atheists are "suppressing knowledge of God" in order to deny the judgment. I've dealt with this at some length before, and the problem with this argument, as I tried to point out, is that I don't have to deny a god's existence in order to deny the Christian God's existence, or in order to deny the Bible's inerrancy, etc. It is a non sequitur of the highest order to say, "If God, then judgment," yet Todd seems to take this leap in logic for granted and as if it is self-evident! The God of the Deists is only one of thousands of completely accessible theistic beliefs that avoid the whole notion of orthodox Christian judgment, along with Islam and Hinduism and etc. To say that atheists "just disbelieve to avoid judgment" is thus laughable.

At the end of the show, notice that he dodged the issue of mercy vs. justice entirely. Like many Christians, he can't seem to comprehend that you cannot both be merciful and just at the same time:

Mercy: Not giving someone what they deserve
Just: Giving someone what they deserve

According to Todd, at the end of the show, God is always just. He always gives people what they deserve. However, with the same breath, and in complete self-contradiction, he claims that all sinners deserve hell, but that some do not receive it, because they "repent and trust"...

The argument is that because God punished Himself, an innocent Person, in order to give mercy, it is still just, because someone "paid for" what I deserve.

So, in this twisted view of justice, an innocent person can be punished for a guilty person's crimes, and this is still just!! No. That is complete rubbish. Instead, this would be barbaric and injust. Now, if the person who is punished volunteers to be punished, then you have mercy, not justice. And if God can be merciful to whomever he pleases, and accept their wrongdoings by forgiving them for those wrongdoings, then of course God can arbitrarily decide to be merciful at his own whim! As Paul said in Romans 9:15-31ff, this sort of God just decides who to have mercy on, and who to judge justly, and can make some people for hell, and some for heaven ("vessels fit for destruction, vessels fit for mercy").

Of course, the question of how the whole "hell = just punishment for sin" argument follows, even if God does put people in hell, is a completely separate, and even more difficult, issue.

DagoodS from DC has dealt with this issue at some length: God gets to make the rules, and one of the rules can be that he doesn't have to enforce them at all times, and thus God gets to decide what justice is and what mercy is. The whole idea that God is "bound" to throw sinners into hell is thus laughable and absurd.

*****
One other thing to highlight: Exapologist points to a new and useful resource on the Christian apologetic commonly known as "presuppositionalism". I have covered this issue at some length here and elsewhere, and Prof. Witmer's intro to the subject, and his interview with Gene Cook, is always a good place to start.
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Technorati tags: God, Religion, Atheism

More on Logic with CalvinDude

CalvinDude is a nice guy. He's a Christian Presuppositionalist (PS). Seeing those two things combined is a rare gift from God ;)

The typical "line of attack" of the PS is to go after the problem of universals -- they ask the atheist to commit to some ontology, then try to argue that said ontology does not "account for" universals. If the atheist commits to physicalism, then universals may indeed be problematic to explain. The theist seizes upon this difficulty and insists that only God (and their particular one, of course) can "account for" universals. Platonic realism solves this problem nicely, in that one asserts that universals merely are, that they are timeless, abstract, and beyond further reduction (the theist wants to translocate them into God, or into God's mind, or into God's nature, etc., but this is both unnecessary and complicates things further -- did God's consciousness of these things precede their existence, or vice versa?). Of course, there is also a solution in the form of Berkeley's extreme nominalism -- that we do not conceive of universals, but of particulars, and the universals are just category-terms that we use to help us organize our minds. But the point is, in neither of these cases are we committed to "grounding" universals in anything resembling "God".

Here is the breakdown of the conversation we've been having, and I've enjoyed:

I told CalvinDude (CD) that I consider logic to be a properly basic belief. He disagreed, and tried to show me why in this post. Basically, it seems we're miscommunicating. He posits that logic cannot self-validate or self-verify. I am saying something a little different -- that belief in logic is absolutely sure -- logic is incorrigible. One cannot ever be proven wrong by saying, "Logical arguments provide true conclusions, so long as the premises are factual." I am also saying that logic is self-evident. I don't think CD disagrees here.

As such, I can conclude that my usage of logic is justified. This is where CD disagrees. He thinks that logic must somehow be "validated/accounted for" despite its accepted truth. This seems akin to me saying, "Sure, you have shown me that the machine works, and that it accomplishes all the purposes you use it for...but if you cannot explain all of its inner workings, then you are not allowed to use it." I would argue that "justifying" logic requires using logic, which is a variant of a tautology and a variant of the stolen concept fallacy (denying a fundamental premise that you must use to "disprove" something else).

Now, what CD wants me to do is to try and get into the metaphysics of logic -- the transcendentals, or preconditions, of reason itself. That is, "What things are necessary to say that logic is true, or to use logic?" This common tactic of the PS is to argue a TAG:

P1) If X, then God
P2) X
C) .: God

Now, Michael Martin and others have responded to this line of reasoning before, and of course the crucial question is, "How is premise 1 justified?"

So far, though, CD has not made this explicit, and we have not gotten into metaphysical explanations of how/where/why logic exists. Again, the way I see it, it is completely unnecessary to explain something which we are justified in using, so long as it is true, and we are justified in using logic as a properly basic belief.

Now, that said, I've attempted to "throw him a bone", so to speak, in this comment: October 8th, 2006 at 4:25 am

I'll throw you out a small bone:

I was reading over the Platonic solution to universals (which seems to be the whole thing we’re discussing in a broad sense), and I find it interesting that one of the definitions of a universal is that we cannot come into contact with them in any meaningful way — they exist outside of space and time.

Let us say for a moment that I am willing to accept the Platonic metaphysical explanada for logic. Let us say that I suspect that anything I can observe, or come into contact with, is physical, or supervenes on the physical.

Have I contradicted myself? So long as I separate the physicalism framework, which I contend and admit does not incorporate Platonic universals, from the other, and say that both are true, and do not contradict, how can you show me that they do?

Physicalism and Platonism seem compatible, since physicalism holds that everything it describes is (in theory) observable, or its effects are, and can be directly or indirectly contacted, and exist within space and time, while Platonism describes (only) those things which fit none of these categories…can I not accept that both are the best description of things that fall into their own frameworks?

I am inching ever-closer to the ground that CD wants to take me, but I am going slowly, and attempting to avoid over-commitment. In the prior comment, I pointed out why I thought it was completely absurd for him to ask me to "justify" logic:

If you “use” logic to disprove logic (which you didn’t accomplish, and can’t, by definition, since the concept of “proof” is contingent upon logic itself being valid), you are committing the fallacy of the stolen concept.

1) Logic cannot be disproven.
2) I cannot be wrong in concluding that logic is true, that its conclusions are true, etc. — therefore it is incorrigible.
3) Logic is self-evident.
4) Therefore, logic is a properly basic belief.

Now, if something is properly basic, it needs no external justification (such as God, or the FSM, or etc). It is true in itself. That does not, admittedly, satisfy us most times. We want further explanation into a phenomenon (which must be kept separate from justification), but we run into a few facts:

1) We will go into infinite regress mode if we do not accept some axioms as “just true as they are”
2) We will go into circularity if we try to tie everything together
3) God does not escape this very issue

Also, I commented on his post in reply to my Logic and Ontology article (his comments are italicized).

I will only reply to a few points at the moment, and try to post something else about this a little later.

This would work if God was a mathematical or logical set…but I don’t know anyone (except Pythagorous) who might think that. :-)

If we cannot represent God in some way, this again points back to the question of logic and whether logic even applies to the concept of God. In what way is God intelligible? We use all of these absolutes: omni’s and perfection and universality and etc…none of which human beings have any true conceptual grasp of, and none of which are veridical, in that they do not find themselves grounded in anything we can use to understand them.

This is part of why I find the “God” solution to things so problematic, be it the deist God or Allah or any of the infinite varities that we can conceive (loosely) of between atheism and some defined Person. It simply doesn’t answer our questions, because the infiinite regress of “justify this via this, and this via this,” seems to hit a wall with the “G word”, but I am convinced that it seems a “solution” only because the very concept of God is so intangiable and unintelligible. How can we critique and analyze this concept in the same way that we do other things? One person asserts one thing about God, one person another, definitions of God are all over the map, and in the end, unlike our definitions which we can agree on, we are left scratching our heads when we make such statements as “God cannot make Itself cease to exist”…or any “God can/can’t do X”…where does such a knowledge come from? From the “omni’s”? How do we begin to apply common logical analysis of absolutes/universals?

This would be a “problem” no matter what you put as the cause of logic.

I agree! If every belief has to be justified by something else, we obviously run into either: 1) an infinite regress, or 2) circularity. Presuppositionalism runs into the latter — belief in logic/etc., is justified by belief in God, which is justified by examining logic/etc. Morality is defined by God, who defines morality. Those sorts of failures.

We are justified in using logic because it is self-evident and incorrigible. Explaining the metaphysics of logic is as unnecessary for someone employing logic, as explaining the workings of your catalytic converter are for someone employing their car.

That is why I do not think that logic has to be justified using any other concept — I consider it properly basic. Logic cannot be disproven, and logic is self-evident.

Truths of formal logic and mathematics, together with semantic truths, statements true by virtue of the very meaning of the nonlogical constants they contain, are certain. These are the traditional truths of reason. But clearly, not every such truth is acceptable as a basic premise. For a mathematical truth may be certain, yet require much ingenuity to show it certain. But surely there are some truths of reason whose status or certainty can be immediately recognized. These propositions are self-evident. What then may we say to the claim that only propositions that concern one’s immediate experience or are self-evident truths of reason, the properly basic propositions of classical foundationalism, are acceptable as basic premises? (from, Acceptable Premises — An Epistemic Approach to an Informal Logic Problem, Section 1.2 Acceptability, Certainty, and Epistemic Duty, J.B. Freeman, amazon)

The bottom line is that whatever causes logic to occur must exist in such a fashion that logic is inevitably the result. We can argue that whatever it is (X) is over logic; but it is over logic in such a manner that logic becomes valid and real. X doesn’t violate logic, it is the grounds of logic.

I believe that X is God. I’m still interested in seeing how you answer what X would be…

But you’re begging the question against my worldview — I do not think anything causes logic to occur. Also, I am not even trying to metaphysically justify the ontology/existence of logic (an abstract form that exists somewhere in the ether, wink-wink). Logic needs nothing “over” it in the same way that you argue that God doesn’t. I believe that X is unnecessary, and you have yet to argue otherwise.

If logic is properly basic and holds primacy, then CD has hit a wall with me, and I think he'll get frustrated in seeing this.

When you accept God as a properly basic belief, you are packaging together a number of premises.

When you accept that the Bible is God’s Word is a valid presupposition, you are packaging together thousands of premises.

In both of these, you say you are justified because no one can show you the absurdities in believing them (a sort of circular and immune system). I can say that there is an invisible pink unicorn (or a flying spaghetti monster) who is the foundation of all things, which itself is uncreated and eternal and absolute, and I have just as “sound” a system as you do. The real question is — is belief in the IPU necessary (as you assert it is by saying that the God/IPU are preconditions to reasoning, etc.), or is it rationally justified? Is there any evidence or experience upon which we can rely to substantiate these beliefs?

How many premises are packaged together with logic? How much more likely are we to be wrong when we incorporate more and more assumptions into our starting points? When we make our presuppositions more complex, we weaken our position, and have more difficulty in defending them.

In an opposite way, I am simply saying that logic needs no explanation in that you cannot disprove it, you cannot reduce it, and in trying to do either, you will be committing the fallacy of the stolen concept. And, so far, I have not even attempted to tackle the question of metaphysics. I do not intend to do so. I will say up front, “I’m just not sure how/why/where logic exists, or if it actually exists, or if it is the result of nominalism, conceptualism, realism, or some combination thereof. However, I am sure that logic is true.”

Atheism doesn’t imply that one has undercut the validity of logic and reason. It implies that God is unnecessary for them, and that solutions which indicate God is are flawed in some way.

There will be more to come, I'm sure.
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Technorati tags: Philosophy

On the Virtue of Fortitude

I noticed I had a link from an old friend, and so I just had to investigate, of course.

CalvinDude is upset at me for not getting what he, and other presups, have so patiently tried to tell me a million times: that the Problem of Evil is dead! The whole Euthyphro Dilemma doesn't apply! He admits that good isn't contingent upon what God says, so I can't catch him on that horn.

Why can't I just get it?

Things aren't good because God wills them that way, or says they are -- instead, goodness is grounded in God's own nature! I mean, "God's nature" is, somehow, some way, supermagicalistically transcendentally disconnected from this dilemma...how can you not get that? Well, all I can conclude is that CalvinDude possesses more fortitude than I, plus I'm stupid, I guess.

Before I paste my response comment, let me say that I appreciate his attempt to extricate God from the Euthyprho Dilemma and to rescue Divine Command Theory from intellectual bankruptcy. I will not promise, though, to deal with this issue more fully myself in the future. I think enough philosophers have spilled enough ink already to see the major problem -- either morality transcends the question of God's own existence (and thus God's nature as well, and whatever would dictate said nature), or it doesn't and it is contingent upon some aspect of God's existence.

This latter clause is the horn Divine Command Theorists are impaled on, and the former clause destroys the argument that God is necessary for, or ontologically serves as, the "foundation" of morality. It's pretty simple to me -- either / or. Now, here is my comment, and if people want to read more on this (the PoE in general, plus Euthyphro's Dilemma), I will have to just tell you to check out some books from the library, because I am too tired and busy to deal with it any further; I just don't have the fortitude (or the spare time + lack of marriage + lack of social life) of the average presuppositionalist, it appears:

sdanielmorgan Says:
January 24th, 2007 at 1:58 pm

I didn’t respond to your later critiques [of Prof. Witmer's paper] due to other priorities at the end of the semester, not out of dejection.

I still haven’t gotten around to sitting down and dealing with a lot of hardcore philosophical issues, because at the moment I’m in the middle of a hardcore chemistry Ph.D. oral candidacy defense. I have, however, made photocopies of some good stuff from Armstrong on universals, including one article called, “Can a Naturalist Believe in Universals?” I also read a book called, “Whatever Happened to Good and Evil?” That lays out a solid case for ethical objectivism and refutes the sort of God-contingent morality you laid out above.

Armstrong’s case I find quite compelling — he argues that particulars have the causal power to “create” universals. His argument is that universals do not have some sort of causal power to instantiate particulars, but vice versa. This really helped me to conceptualize universals a little better (not necessarily that now, I do so quite well) because what plagued me was in imagining something outside of space and time instantiating anything. What is instantiation? An action? A causal connection? How does it interact? This same problem would bother me if these universals were supposedly inside of God’s mind, or whatever. The argument is “Universals arise from particulars, and not the other way around.” And for whatever reason, this is a pill I can better swallow.

It’s a kind of standard issue for any sort of dualism — how do things of different elemental substances interact? How could they cause or affect one another? And these sorts of open-ended questions exist for the theist and the atheist. Saying that, because morality has an intrinsically non-time-space-matter-contingent character (just as logic and mathematical truths and other abstracta do), that this necessitates a Person to nicely “account” for these things.

First, I will tell you that I do not accept the logical validity of any form of relativism or subjectivism. Either good and evil are real properties, just like red and round, or they are not. Our perception of them does not make them so. Neither does God’s. Either logic and mathematical truths and morality constrain the nature of reality (including God’s own definitions), as well as what and who God can be and is, or those things somehow become a contingency of God’s existence, which is not possible. You seem to try to avoid contingency by making a sort of “parallel” argument, but I don’t have the time to deal with it right now.

I will only comment here to say that I don’t buy into “God’s morality” and “man’s morality”. You almost sound like a relativist with such statements. There is only good and evil — transcending personhood. Either moral properties exist, or they do not. Either moral propositions are true, or they are not. They are not made real/true by God’s existence, and virtual/false by God’s nonexistence. Equivalent to, “2+2=4,” so, “Causing harm for fun is evil,” does not depend on God in any way. It is the nature of reality — it is logically necessary…what evil is, and what good is, not what God makes them or what God is.

As Prof. Witmer said in his interview with Gene Cook — it is the nature of what it is to be evil to cause harm for fun. It is a real property of that state of affairs (causing harm for fun). It is the nature of what it is to be good to alleviate suffering whenever possible. In the same way that 2+2=4, it is foundational, self-evident and incorrigible, and it matters not one iota whether God exists or not to make it true. That’s my situation. I stop there. The regress ends there for me.

To me, the sort of person who requires justification for those propositions is the same as the person who says, “But why is blue darker than yellow?” I cannot bring myself to waste time in trying to justify it.

One reason I stopped arguing much with you guys is that you only have one weapon in your arsenal: the one Sextus Empiricus developed long before the days of Jesus — the regress argument. Presuppositionalists want to use the classical regress arguments to destroy the foundation of anyone’s knowledge; excepting, of course, propositions like “God exists,” and “God is all-good, all-powerful…” as valid foundations. But the sort of skepticism you advocate is colored — to the degree you apply it, it undermines the validity of others’ presuppositions. But, you cannot maintain the same degree of global skepticism without self-refuting; turning that skepticism inward on yourself will leave you in the same boat as me.

I haven’t dealt with epistemology as I plan to — I have had one presuppositionalist recommend the book, “Longing to Know” to me as a good one to start out with as a primer on Christian views on epistemic problems. I take certain beliefs for granted, and I would argue strongly that others do too, for the simple reason that they are justified by my own experience and their intuitive, self-evident quality.

For me, armchair philosophy is a hobby, and I really do enjoy it. But, I lose myself sometimes in it, and neglect other things (like getting my Ph.D. finished). It is very hard to be very good at chemistry and at philosophy. Maybe some people can do it; perhaps they have more brilliance or time, or both, than I do.

Anyway, for me this is a sort of process, not some search for a “magic bullet” argument to convince me about God one way or the other. The problem of evil is the single argument that I think renders theism irrational; I would be agnostic if it weren’t for the PoE. If I could find a real solution to it, I’d drop back to agnosticism, rather than believing that the conception of God as all-good and all-powerful is illogical, given the existence of evil. Anyway, I miss our chats, but I also enjoy my newfound productivity. One day, I’ll really try to get around to your latter responses to Prof. Witmer.

I like the new look of the blog.

Best,
D

I thought this long comment worth sharing. I would add that global, unrelenting skepticism falls on its own sword. You can't know what you can't know. But you know that you exist, you know that logic is valid, that 2+2=4...and you cannot make yourself not believe certain things. Plus, the regress problem is typically approached by looking at epistemology -- coherentism and classical foundationalism.

I'm tired. Fortitude is developed this way, they tell me.
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