The typical "line of attack" of the PS is to go after the problem of universals -- they ask the atheist to commit to some ontology, then try to argue that said ontology does not "account for" universals. If the atheist commits to physicalism, then universals may indeed be problematic to explain. The theist seizes upon this difficulty and insists that only God (and their particular one, of course) can "account for" universals. Platonic realism solves this problem nicely, in that one asserts that universals merely are, that they are timeless, abstract, and beyond further reduction (the theist wants to translocate them into God, or into God's mind, or into God's nature, etc., but this is both unnecessary and complicates things further -- did God's consciousness of these things precede their existence, or vice versa?). Of course, there is also a solution in the form of Berkeley's extreme nominalism -- that we do not conceive of universals, but of particulars, and the universals are just category-terms that we use to help us organize our minds. But the point is, in neither of these cases are we committed to "grounding" universals in anything resembling "God".
Here is the breakdown of the conversation we've been having, and I've enjoyed:
I told CalvinDude (CD) that I consider logic to be a properly basic belief. He disagreed, and tried to show me why in this post. Basically, it seems we're miscommunicating. He posits that logic cannot self-validate or self-verify. I am saying something a little different -- that belief in logic is absolutely sure -- logic is incorrigible. One cannot ever be proven wrong by saying, "Logical arguments provide true conclusions, so long as the premises are factual." I am also saying that logic is self-evident. I don't think CD disagrees here.
As such, I can conclude that my usage of logic is justified. This is where CD disagrees. He thinks that logic must somehow be "validated/accounted for" despite its accepted truth. This seems akin to me saying, "Sure, you have shown me that the machine works, and that it accomplishes all the purposes you use it for...but if you cannot explain all of its inner workings, then you are not allowed to use it." I would argue that "justifying" logic requires using logic, which is a variant of a tautology and a variant of the stolen concept fallacy (denying a fundamental premise that you must use to "disprove" something else).
Now, what CD wants me to do is to try and get into the metaphysics of logic -- the transcendentals, or preconditions, of reason itself. That is, "What things are necessary to say that logic is true, or to use logic?" This common tactic of the PS is to argue a TAG:
P1) If X, then GodNow, Michael Martin and others have responded to this line of reasoning before, and of course the crucial question is, "How is premise 1 justified?"
P2) X
C) .: God
So far, though, CD has not made this explicit, and we have not gotten into metaphysical explanations of how/where/why logic exists. Again, the way I see it, it is completely unnecessary to explain something which we are justified in using, so long as it is true, and we are justified in using logic as a properly basic belief.
Now, that said, I've attempted to "throw him a bone", so to speak, in this comment: October 8th, 2006 at 4:25 am
I'll throw you out a small bone:I am inching ever-closer to the ground that CD wants to take me, but I am going slowly, and attempting to avoid over-commitment. In the prior comment, I pointed out why I thought it was completely absurd for him to ask me to "justify" logic:I was reading over the Platonic solution to universals (which seems to be the whole thing we’re discussing in a broad sense), and I find it interesting that one of the definitions of a universal is that we cannot come into contact with them in any meaningful way — they exist outside of space and time.
Let us say for a moment that I am willing to accept the Platonic metaphysical explanada for logic. Let us say that I suspect that anything I can observe, or come into contact with, is physical, or supervenes on the physical.
Have I contradicted myself? So long as I separate the physicalism framework, which I contend and admit does not incorporate Platonic universals, from the other, and say that both are true, and do not contradict, how can you show me that they do?
Physicalism and Platonism seem compatible, since physicalism holds that everything it describes is (in theory) observable, or its effects are, and can be directly or indirectly contacted, and exist within space and time, while Platonism describes (only) those things which fit none of these categories…can I not accept that both are the best description of things that fall into their own frameworks?
If you “use” logic to disprove logic (which you didn’t accomplish, and can’t, by definition, since the concept of “proof” is contingent upon logic itself being valid), you are committing the fallacy of the stolen concept.Also, I commented on his post in reply to my Logic and Ontology article (his comments are italicized).
1) Logic cannot be disproven.
2) I cannot be wrong in concluding that logic is true, that its conclusions are true, etc. — therefore it is incorrigible.
3) Logic is self-evident.
4) Therefore, logic is a properly basic belief.
Now, if something is properly basic, it needs no external justification (such as God, or the FSM, or etc). It is true in itself. That does not, admittedly, satisfy us most times. We want further explanation into a phenomenon (which must be kept separate from justification), but we run into a few facts:
1) We will go into infinite regress mode if we do not accept some axioms as “just true as they are”
2) We will go into circularity if we try to tie everything together
3) God does not escape this very issue
If logic is properly basic and holds primacy, then CD has hit a wall with me, and I think he'll get frustrated in seeing this.I will only reply to a few points at the moment, and try to post something else about this a little later.
This would work if God was a mathematical or logical set…but I don’t know anyone (except Pythagorous) who might think that. :-)
If we cannot represent God in some way, this again points back to the question of logic and whether logic even applies to the concept of God. In what way is God intelligible? We use all of these absolutes: omni’s and perfection and universality and etc…none of which human beings have any true conceptual grasp of, and none of which are veridical, in that they do not find themselves grounded in anything we can use to understand them.
This is part of why I find the “God” solution to things so problematic, be it the deist God or Allah or any of the infinite varities that we can conceive (loosely) of between atheism and some defined Person. It simply doesn’t answer our questions, because the infiinite regress of “justify this via this, and this via this,” seems to hit a wall with the “G word”, but I am convinced that it seems a “solution” only because the very concept of God is so intangiable and unintelligible. How can we critique and analyze this concept in the same way that we do other things? One person asserts one thing about God, one person another, definitions of God are all over the map, and in the end, unlike our definitions which we can agree on, we are left scratching our heads when we make such statements as “God cannot make Itself cease to exist”…or any “God can/can’t do X”…where does such a knowledge come from? From the “omni’s”? How do we begin to apply common logical analysis of absolutes/universals?
This would be a “problem” no matter what you put as the cause of logic.
I agree! If every belief has to be justified by something else, we obviously run into either: 1) an infinite regress, or 2) circularity. Presuppositionalism runs into the latter — belief in logic/etc., is justified by belief in God, which is justified by examining logic/etc. Morality is defined by God, who defines morality. Those sorts of failures.
We are justified in using logic because it is self-evident and incorrigible. Explaining the metaphysics of logic is as unnecessary for someone employing logic, as explaining the workings of your catalytic converter are for someone employing their car.
That is why I do not think that logic has to be justified using any other concept — I consider it properly basic. Logic cannot be disproven, and logic is self-evident.
Truths of formal logic and mathematics, together with semantic truths, statements true by virtue of the very meaning of the nonlogical constants they contain, are certain. These are the traditional truths of reason. But clearly, not every such truth is acceptable as a basic premise. For a mathematical truth may be certain, yet require much ingenuity to show it certain. But surely there are some truths of reason whose status or certainty can be immediately recognized. These propositions are self-evident. What then may we say to the claim that only propositions that concern one’s immediate experience or are self-evident truths of reason, the properly basic propositions of classical foundationalism, are acceptable as basic premises? (from, Acceptable Premises — An Epistemic Approach to an Informal Logic Problem, Section 1.2 Acceptability, Certainty, and Epistemic Duty, J.B. Freeman, amazon)
The bottom line is that whatever causes logic to occur must exist in such a fashion that logic is inevitably the result. We can argue that whatever it is (X) is over logic; but it is over logic in such a manner that logic becomes valid and real. X doesn’t violate logic, it is the grounds of logic.
I believe that X is God. I’m still interested in seeing how you answer what X would be…
But you’re begging the question against my worldview — I do not think anything causes logic to occur. Also, I am not even trying to metaphysically justify the ontology/existence of logic (an abstract form that exists somewhere in the ether, wink-wink). Logic needs nothing “over” it in the same way that you argue that God doesn’t. I believe that X is unnecessary, and you have yet to argue otherwise.
How many premises are packaged together with logic? How much more likely are we to be wrong when we incorporate more and more assumptions into our starting points? When we make our presuppositions more complex, we weaken our position, and have more difficulty in defending them.When you accept God as a properly basic belief, you are packaging together a number of premises.
When you accept that the Bible is God’s Word is a valid presupposition, you are packaging together thousands of premises.
In both of these, you say you are justified because no one can show you the absurdities in believing them (a sort of circular and immune system). I can say that there is an invisible pink unicorn (or a flying spaghetti monster) who is the foundation of all things, which itself is uncreated and eternal and absolute, and I have just as “sound” a system as you do. The real question is — is belief in the IPU necessary (as you assert it is by saying that the God/IPU are preconditions to reasoning, etc.), or is it rationally justified? Is there any evidence or experience upon which we can rely to substantiate these beliefs?
In an opposite way, I am simply saying that logic needs no explanation in that you cannot disprove it, you cannot reduce it, and in trying to do either, you will be committing the fallacy of the stolen concept. And, so far, I have not even attempted to tackle the question of metaphysics. I do not intend to do so. I will say up front, “I’m just not sure how/why/where logic exists, or if it actually exists, or if it is the result of nominalism, conceptualism, realism, or some combination thereof. However, I am sure that logic is true.”There will be more to come, I'm sure.Atheism doesn’t imply that one has undercut the validity of logic and reason. It implies that God is unnecessary for them, and that solutions which indicate God is are flawed in some way.
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