Monday, January 8, 2007

Euthyphro Dilemma: Solved by Invoking "God's Nature"?

I left a comment (you have to open the +/- comment box) on a recent post at DC I wanted to share. I have created a hypothetical dialogue between a theist and an atheist over the Euthyphro Dilemma concerning Divine Command Theory. Theists try to evade the issue by invoking "God's nature" as a basis for God's action, supposedly removing the arbitrary issue involved. This highlights much of the supposed "debate" between theists and atheists over the "basis/foundation" of morality, IMHO:
Atheist: Please define "good" for me.

Theist: Anything God does.

Atheist: And so how do you know when God acts, or that it is God doing something, rather than a devil, or just us humans?

Theist: God's nature is clearly different than human nature, and that of the devil.

Atheist: How do you know God's nature?

Theist: From Scripture and revelation.

Atheist: And how do you know that something IS Scripture [holy writings] or revelation?

Theist: Okay, you have a good point. We both get caught in vicious infinite regresses, or in circularity, if we do this all day. By fiat, I'll define God's nature as "perfectly good" and say that everything God does follows from God's own nature. I'll also presuppose that God is revealed in the Bible and that I can know God's nature from that.

Atheist: By fiat, I will define/presuppose "causing senseless and extensive suffering, when one need not cause it," as evil.

Theist: Well, what is your "basis" for such? Isn't that arbitrary?

Atheist: Isn't it circular and arbitrary to pick the Bible as your source of revelation, to claim that God is revealed therein, to claim this God has a perfectly good nature, and to justify it in a circular manner?

Theist: Well my starting point is to say I have found the ultimate goodness and ultimate authority -- this lends normativity to me.

Atheist: I don't see that you can "create" such a starting point, any more than I can avoid needing one by simply declaring the proposition itself authoritative and without need of some "person" behind it.

Theist: Fine, I'll agree with your definition of evil, so long as you'll exclude God from being that "one". Grant me that God can never be evil. You see, God always acts out of God's own nature, which is perfectly good.

Atheist: So you mean the act itself does not have a moral status, nor its consequences? Murder is not de facto wrong? All that we can pass valid moral judgment upon is who acted it out?

Theist: That is correct. If human beings decide to follow their nature [evil] and kill babies, it is evil. However, if God follows God's own nature and orders the slaughter of babies [1 Sam 15:3, etc], it is good.

Atheist: Let's see -- if God causes extensive suffering which God could have otherwise avoided, then "God's nature" is evil in my definition. If anyone else causes it, I would say the same about their own nature. You sound like a relativist. How do you avoid the charge of relativism?

Theist: But when God commands the slaughter of innocents in the OT, or allows children to rot of cancer, or does not limit the freedom of a child rapist, God has followed a perfectly good nature.

Atheist: But I thought we're trying to figure out whether something is good ipso facto by its origin [who did it] versus what it is. It doesn't seem to me to be very valid to say you can define God as good, and thus whatever God does as good, if you aren't actually defining morality by judging actions, or using consequentialism to some degree, objectively. Instead of being able to say, "X is evil," you have to qualify everything as contingent upon whether or not God is involved. This seems to remove any moral significance from God's supposed "goodness". It seems all you're doing is begging questions and committing circularity.

Theist: Well...how do you defend your use of logic? My God made it, and you can't use it without my God.

Atheist: *rolls eyes and walks away*

This is how I genuinely feel after most debates with theists. And I've seen this in action a few times -- especially ending the dialogue via burden-shifting. But I've also seen good examples of theists who do a great job of defending a position, even if the premises upon which they argue are not, by my judgment, valid. I went through a bit of a phase in which I nearly incessantly argued with theists for months about philosophy, especially the presuppositional apologetic mode.

It seems to have run its course in me, being satisfied that they:
i) confused the issue of presuppositions, proof-burdens and their validity
ii) never admit that they themselves run into either a vicious regress or circularity, just as everyone else does -- they seem to think they have, by fiat, presuppositions that are more valid just because the label "God" is attached

The most obvious example of (ii) is in the evasion of the issue of how "God's nature" solves the Euthyphro Dilemma with their absurd circularity and tautologies: God's nature is good, God is not arbitrary because God's moral character is what is followed, good is defined as whatever God does/commands/etc...
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