You can count me among those who do not find the argument from evil compelling.I responded by asking him why, by way of theodicy. He said his theodicy was a combination of the views of Boethius and Liebnitz. My reply (open the comments box and scroll down):
Robert,Hopefully he'll reply. I don't see much in these two men's theodicies that seems terribly compatible.
Now that's interesting, as those two seem very different. I'd love to hear more.
Are you an orthodox Christian? I mean, considering that neither of these theodicies are Christian in the "orthodox" sense.
Boethius was anti-Augustinian, anti-Pauline in his conception of judgment and punishment of the wicked:
"...anything which turns away from goodness ceases to exist..." (Book IV, 125)
believed that wrong is done in error:
"...the mind seeks its own good, though like a drunkard it cannot find the path home" (Book III, 80)
One of the most serious flaws I found in Boethius was when he asked Lady Philosophy (Book V, 149):
"But is there room in this chain of close-knit causes for any freedom of the will? Or does the chain of Fate bind even the impulses of the human mind?"
and she answered,
"There is freedom," she said. "For it would be impossible for any rational nature to exist without it."
Yes and no. Freedom of will and freedom of action and freedom of knowledge are all separate, and must be thought of as such.
i) The will cannot choose to act upon that which it does not know
ii) The knowledge of a creature is determined by God - experiences, senses, and revelation
iii) The limits of action are twofold -- a) what the will can choose among its options; b) and what the person can physically accomplish
iv) Apropos (b), God sets the limits of human physical freedom by their bodily functions, their environment, their resources, etc.
v) Therefore, from the top to bottom, we see the crucial consideration of how God limits "freedom", from the very knowledge that the will sifts through to choose, to the will itself choosing among options which are available to it, to the creature being able to act upon that which it has chosen
Lady Philosophy talks on to Boethius:
"Whatever by nature has the use of reason has the power of judgment to decide each matter ... "
Again, the question of what humans know, and who controls that knowledge, is operative
"Human souls are of necessity more free when they continue in the contemplation of the mind of God and less free when they descend to bodies, and less still when they are imprisoned in earthly flesh and blood."
Then one must wonder why it is that humans were imprisoned thusly.
"They reach an extremity of enslavement when they give themselves up to wickedness and lose possession of their proper reason ..."
This sounds like a claim describing how our natures are made: we get "enslaved" to wickedness, and thus "lose" reason. But does it have to be such? Could the nature of man not be made (by the God, or whatever) such that "dabbling" in wickedness is possible, and retaining ones wits in the process thereof? His claim that doing wickedness = done in error = malfunction of the mind seems to clearly indict the maker of the mind with fault. This claim reinforces the ultimate responsibility of the maker of the nature of man. Did man's nature have to be made such that his mind can be "like a drunkard" and "enslaved" and "lose reason"? Does this theodicy solve the problem of evil at all, or merely describe it?
Of course, Boethius is more Plato and Aristotle than Paul and Augustine. I find that interesting, given that I thought you were an orthodox Christian of some sort or another.
On the other hand, Liebnitz seems an odd one to hybridize Boethius with. Unless you claim that the nature of man is the "least evil, greatest good" that it could possibly be -- that God could not have altered man's mind, man's knowledge, man's choices, man's freedom of action, to reduce evil further and increase good further? Perhaps this is how they hybridize?
Liebnitz argued that this was "the best of all possible worlds", and that this world had the greatest good and least evil possible -- his "sufficient reason" arguments.
In response, I would point to those sorts of evils that have absolutely no plausible explanation insofar as a "sufficient reason" -- clear accidents that did not involve human will, natural disasters (like the earthquake of Lisbon that all but killed the will of those defending Liebnitz' argument), etc. It is implausible to argue that God found it necessary to allow that evil in "the best of all possible worlds".
The natural disasters of the earth were necessary? God could not have made a world in which there was no need for earthquakes, tidal waves, volcanoes, etc.?
As Pangloss satirized in Candide, "the bay of Lisbon had been formed expressly for [Jacques] to drown in": is the sufficient reason of these natural evils that God made them so that humans and other animals would suffer their consequences?
Or are we to believe that the evil of those things is the least that it could be? That there really could be no fewer earthquakes and volcanoes, no fewer famines and droughts? Again, if God is in control of Nature, this argument reeks of absurdity from an evidentialist standpoint. From a logical standpoint, perhaps you could mount some sufficient reason, however unlikely or unbelievable (such as limits on the nature of man, or on God's creative freedom).
To claim that there is "sufficient reason" that a 1-year-old child died after a fall from a head injury, when trying to learn to walk, would be an interesting claim. It involves no natural processes, other than gravity, it involves no true sense of human free will, etc., etc. It becomes even more incredulous if you tack on something about the fate of the person's life, considering the necessity of their birth in the first place, if they were destined to die thusly, and also consider the people who have been allowed to live and inflict great harm on humanity (Hitler, Pol Pot, Stalin, etc.).
Perhaps you can enlighten me with more details? A post on your blog?
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