An excerpt from that paper in defining moral objectivism:
We mean a set of moral truths that would remain true no matter what any individual or social group thought or desired. The notion of objective morality is antithetical to all forms of moral subjectivism. It holds, first, that we have moral beliefs that are either true or false; that they are not mere expressions of emotion, akin to sighs of pleasure or pain. It holds, secondly, that the truth or falsity of our moral judgments is a function of whether or not the objects of moral appraisal, agents and their actions, have the moral properties that we ascribe to them; that their truth or falsity is not merely a function of the thoughts, feelings, or attitudes of individuals or the conventions of society. And it holds, thirdly, that there may well be moral truths still awaiting our discovery, through revelation (on the theist's account) or through reason and experience--together, perhaps, with our changing biology--(on my account).Something I have no doubts of is that morality must be approached objectively if one is to use reason to discuss moral truths -- ie if one assumes that moral facts exist. I have tried to explain how my own view of morality can be grounded in simple truths about human survival, socialization, and empathy. In short, if humans exist, and if there are a range of options about how they might behave towards one another, then cooperative, kind behavior is one of those options. The reason it is good, I argue, is that it leads to more pleasure, happiness, less pain, longer lifespan, health, wealth...etc. Moral behavior, derivable from a simple set of virtues, can be shown to produce these effects. If we agree that these effects are good, then you now know what is good, and if you know what is good, you ought to do good for the sake of good itself. This is certainly a consequentialist view, but such a simple precept seems quite compatible with a standalone deontological virtue theory.
All that said, I will gladly admit that I have more reading to do and need to strengthen my arguments for objective morality. But there is some part of me that questions, still, whether morality is a metaphysically ultimate, absolute and normative.
Although I am quite sure that reason/logic are metaphysically ultimate and necessary entities, and therefore not contingent upon any other conditions or truths, I am not sure that the same applies to ethics. This is something I've been thinking about for some time, but I haven't done enough reading on to feel confident either way. I am not a moral relativist, per se, but I do not know if the same sort of transcendent status can be applied to morality as can be applied to logical and mathematical truths.
Bradley argued against Dr. Paul Chamberlain in a debate about the question, "Is Objective Morality Possible Without God?" Bradley mentioned this debate in reference [8] of the paper above, and an overview of the debate was written up in The Peak, the student newspaper at SFU. Check it out.
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