non serviam ergo fiat lux: Morality and atheism: an introduction

In this introduction, I lay out my perspective and approach, and my feeling that we'll either run into a regress or circularity fairly quickly; the latter is to be avoided at all costs. In the first post -- part one -- I analyze atheism and morality by looking at two critical issues: 1) whether morality can in fact be contingent on God's nature, 2) whether invoking God's nature gives us an adequate explanation of goodness. In the next post -- part two -- I analyze whether God's nature can conform to the objective standards of goodness and virtues, or whether evidence and logic contradict this approach. Finally, in the last post -- part three -- I want to lay out a case for moral motivation and justification that I think makes being a moral atheist not only good (by definition), but rational.

Outline of posts:

Introduction

Although I have, on more than one occasion, attempted to talk about morality flowing from basic facts about human nature and society, I also put on a thick coat of whitewash and preface everything with, "I never took a philosophy course...so forgive my errors..." But it's not a real excuse to commit fallacies of logic, and so I'm going to try to parse out some things about morality that I've pondered on for a long time and make them clear. Also, there's no excuse for indolence, and I've procrastinated on writing up a more clear and extensive treatment of morality than my last attempts for a long time, partly out of recognition of the work it would require.

I think of myself as someone who is capable of at least some degree of objectivity in analysis, and I think I've shown that in criticizing fellow atheists for dismissing valid theistic arguments and criticizing what is thought of as "militant atheism" as well. Like the lib-deb, there are things about the culture of atheism I sincerely dislike. I also admit freely that there are things about strictly materialistic naturalism that are unattractive to deal with, when compared with religious and transcendent dealings. I think that this is due to the ability of a theist to simply invoke certain phrases which effectively end any philosophical inquiry or analysis, such as "God's nature" or "God's will" or other mysterious things which they sort of fall back on when pressed on something difficult. I want to see if perhaps these maneuvers, or belief in a god generally, are a valid way to deal with morality. Even though I don't believe in the Christian God (for reasons manifold), if I found out that there was a good argument to believe in the God of Aristotle and Ben Franklin, I could easily live with that. Also, it takes quite a few leaps and bounds to get from a philosophically-necessary god (little "g") to the God of the Jews or Christians or Muslims from revelation and Scripture.

It may be the case that there are simply some philosophical problems that are insoluble. If that is true, and if morality is one of those things, all that it means is that there is no final clear solution to questions like, "what is the good?" and "how ought man live?" If that is the case, then perhaps whether or not we believe in God, we come to a place where assumptions must be made (presuppositions) that are incapable of being reduced further or explained further. The sorts of theists who make these arguments include, but are not limited to, presuppositionalists. When this happens for the theist, they may invoke a god-related phrase to end the regress, while an atheist may simply say, "perhaps that's just all there is to it." When this point occurs, does the theist have a "leg up" on the atheist? Do they have more philosophical economy and currency, or are the god-related phrases just another way to layer on complexity and mystery, rather than clarifying the problem? If I say, "it seems that the nature of morality is such that moral actions have the property of producing happiness, health and wealth, while immoral actions produce pain and suffering, and perhaps that's all there is to it," have I lost an argument with a theist who says, "moral actions are a reflection of God's nature"?

It seems that we have two basic options when it comes to justification: 1) a regress that ends with a basic belief, or brute, irreducible fact, or 2) a circular system of justification. In 1) we see justifications of the form, "A is based on B, which is based on C, which is based on D...Z is a standalone presupposition." An example of this: "I wash my shirt because I want to be clean and smell good; I want to be clean and smell good in order to be sociable and attract a mate; I want to be sociable and attract a mate because these are my biological nature; my biological nature is an insurmountable part of me and my happiness." It is understood that we reach some basic (brute) fact upon which we agree the problem is not easily digested any further, and hopefully we are satisfied with the progress and rationale in ending there. These can be thought of as axioms or basic beliefs.

In 2) we see justifications of the form, "A is based on B, which is based on C, which is based on A, which is based on C, which is based on B..." An example of this: "I believe that God exists; I believe that the Bible is God's Word; I believe that a strict-literal-historical interpretation of the Bible is imperative because the Bible itself has been translated and preserved by God; the Bible reveals God and shows me that God exists..." and in this sort of justification we see an interdependent set of premises that are set out to sustain an overarching world view or religious belief. In my particular example, there is a hierarchy of linkage: obviously if the first premise is false, all the rest are false as well. That is not necessary. Sometimes, A, B and C are all on "equal footing" and if one fails, then the others are still left standing, albeit with one less "linkage".

It's possible that all justifications will come back to one of these two ending points: 1) a brute fact or presupposition, or 2) a vicious circularity. If that is indeed the case, then all we can hope to do in our arguments and justifications is simply avoid contradiction and incoherence. So long as we don't set out some thing B which logically violates some thing A, then we may be offering substantively similar rationales. I am inclined to believe that (1) is supremely favored over (2), for the simple reason that circularity doesn't imply any sort of progress, which some degree of progress can be made in chaining together logical premises. Circular reasoning is recognized as fallacious, while limited reasoning and knowledge leading to basic beliefs is not. Also, by the very nature of either: a) our limited and mortal minds, b) our language, or c) both of these, it is possible we are simply never going to be able to unify all philosophical questions and solve all philosophical problems and answer all philosophical questions. This implies that basic beliefs and axioms may always exist.

In closing, what I have hoped to do in this introduction: I wanted to point out my attitude coming in to any dialog or analysis of atheism and morality. I wanted to point to my attempts at objectivity and willingness to concede that god(s) or a God may exist, given certain limitations. I wanted to point out the general direction that such analyses/arguments will go: towards properly basic (unjustified) beliefs, also known as brute facts, or towards circularity. I have staked out that a regress is preferred over circular reasoning, and so what I'm already asserting is that basic presuppositions will be staked out.

Sunday, June 22, 2008

Morality and atheism: an introduction